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PUBLIC USE IN THE DIRIGISTE TRADITION: 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC BENEFIT IN AN ERA OF 
AGGLOMERATION 
Steven J. Eagle* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the development of eminent domain law, focusing 
on the U.S. Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals’ approach 
to the requirement that takings be for “public use.”  It asserts that the Su-
preme Court’s public use doctrine is conceptually incomplete.  In applying 
that doctrine and its own precedents, the Court of Appeals acts in the 
State’s tradition of dirigisme, and subordinates constitutional protections 
for private property to centralized development.  Its recent Goldstein and 
Kaur opinions, uncritically supporting development for economic agglome-
ration, are the culmination of this approach. 
The Article also discusses implications for public policy arising from 
condemnation for transfer for private redevelopment, as hastened by gov-
ernment efforts to stimulate agglomeration.  These include a lack of trans-
parency, secondary rent seeking, possibilities of corruption resulting from 
crony capitalism, and the inefficient use of public and private recourses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article is about dirigisme, the “policy of state direction and control 
in economic and social matters,”1 as it relates to state control of land use.  It 
also is about the Public Use Clause, its evasive conceptualization by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Appeals’ reflexive appli-
cation of the Supreme Court’s public use cases.  As the French proverb 
would put it, the Court of Appeals’ abrogation of its duty, together with an 
 
 1. 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 692 (6th ed. 2007). 
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underlying policy that takes us down the path of inefficient land use and 
crony capitalism, is worse than a crime—it is a blunder. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London2 
makes clear that the exercise of eminent domain no longer is constrained 
by traditional concepts of use by the public and the prevention of harm.  
The New York Court of Appeals had reached that conclusion over forty 
years earlier, by Cannata v. City of New York.3  However, the majority in 
Kelo expressly assured that courts would confront abuses of eminent do-
main when and if they arise. 
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 
Bank,4 the Supreme Court implicitly assured that federal courts would re-
view claims that state and local governments took private property in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, although those claims first 
would have to be “ripened” in state court.5  Yet, as it turns out, the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel means that the very act of ripening a case for federal 
judicial review precludes its merits from being considered by the federal 
court.6 As Professor Thomas Roberts observed, the landowners “unders-
tandable reaction” is that this “perpetrates a fraud or hoax.”7  “Ironically, 
an unripe suit is barred at the moment it comes into existence.  Like a to-
mato that suffers vine rot, it goes from being green to mushy red overnight.  
It is never able to be eaten.”8  Roberts was not troubled by this apparent 
bait-and-switch, being dismayed only by the fact that it “is surprising to 
those who are misled by the language of ripeness, which suggests that the 
state law suit is merely preparatory to a federal suit.”9 
The State of New York has a tradition of strong government in many 
areas, including land use regulation and takings.10  The New York Court of 
Appeals has a tradition of deference to legislative and administrative ac-
 
 2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 3. 182 N.E.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. 1962) (upholding condemnation of mostly vacant area 
subdivided as to “prevent effective economic development”). 
 4. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 5. Id. at 186. 
 6. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 7. Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Lit-
igation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37, 71 (1995). 
 8. Id. at 72. 
 9. Id. at 67.  Roberts characterized the state compensation prong of Williamson “as a 
forum restricting rule, rather than a ripeness rule, provid[ing] more accuracy and safety.” Id. 
at 39. 
 10. See Leah Moren Green, The Erie Canal and the American Imagination: the Erie 
Canal’s Effects on American Legal Development, 1817-1869, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1170-
71 (2005). 
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tions.11  Recent decisions by the Court of Appeals in Goldstein v. New York 
State Urban Development Corp.,12 and Kaur v. New York State Urban De-
velopment Corp.,13 together with a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decision in the related Goldstein v. Pataki case,14 forebode that the 
Supreme Court’s assurances in Kelo that courts will confront eminent do-
main abuse will prove as evanescent as the Williamson tomato that turns 
from green to mushy red. 
Ultimately, Goldstein and Kaur represent a continuation of the late Chief 
Judge Charles D. Breitel’s declaration in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York15 that the State commands “the accumulated indirect 
social and direct governmental investment” that provided most of its value 
to physical property.16 
I.  DIRIGISME AND NEW YORK 
Dirigisme has long antecedents in New York law and policy, dating to 
the philosophical underpinnings of the State’s constitution and law.17  It is 
perhaps best associated with the economic policies of New York’s Alexan-
der Hamilton, who was convinced of the need and desirability of govern-
ment involvement in the state and national economy.18  Hamilton wanted a 
“government that would actively participate in the economy, regulating it 
and creating monopolies as it saw fit[, seeking] not to create an economy 
based on free enterprise, but one based on regulation and government in-
tervention.”19  Despite Hamilton’s untimely death, his economic philoso-
phy survived and prospered, and was put to almost immediate use in the 
 
 11. See generally Yonkers Comm. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975); 
Denihan Enters. v. O’Dwyer, 99 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 1951); Kahlen v. State, 119 N.E. 883 
(N.Y. 1918); Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837); Oneonta 
Light & Power Co. v. Schwarzenbach, 150 N.Y.S. 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914), aff’d, 114 
N.E. 1075 (N.Y. 1916). 
 12. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 13. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 14. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 15. 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 16. Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added). See infra Part IV.A for further discussion. 
 17. DOUGLAS AMBROSE & ROBERT W.T. MARTIN, THE MANY FACES OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON: THE LIFE & LEGACY OF AMERICA’S MOST ELUSIVE FOUNDING FATHER 26, 169-
70 (2006); EVAN CORNOG, THE BIRTH OF EMPIRE: DEWITT CLINTON AND THE AMERICAN EX-
PERIENCE 1769-1828, at 104, 112-13, 116-17 (1998). 
 18. STEPHEN F. KNOTT, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MYTH 43, 54 
(2002). 
 19. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of 
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 358 n.39 (1989). 
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State’s support for the Erie Canal.20  Hamilton’s successors such as DeWitt 
Clinton saw great potential economic benefits in completing the massive 
infrastructure project, and when private attempts to finance and construct 
the Erie Canal failed, they were eager to step in and direct the development 
in the direction they saw fit.21  A successor to Governor Clinton, William 
H. Seward, declared: 
[I]t is not only the right but the bounden duty of the legislature to adopt 
measures for overcoming physical obstructions to trade and commerce in 
this state, and for furnishing to each region, as far as reasonable, practica-
ble facilities of access to the great commercial emporium of the Union, 
fortunately located within our own borders.22 
In addition to sparking enthusiasm for major internal improvements, the 
Erie Canal significantly altered the development of New York law. 
Despite the previous century’s insistence on natural rights, of which prop-
erty ownership was one, American citizens began to realize that this in-
terpretation of property rights would impede the country’s ability to ex-
pand and prosper economically.  To achieve this new economic 
development, it was necessary for private individuals to sacrifice their 
property for the canal.23 
The requisition of private land by canal contractors produced a broader 
definition of “public use” as well.24  In the area of education, another form 
of infrastructure or capital, the French tradition of dirigisme was actually 
imported from New York.  The State early administered “Regents Exami-
nations,” a precursor to what much later became commonplace standar-
dized testing.25  Since 1784, the Regents have presided over the University 
of the State of New York, and “are responsible for the general supervision 
of all educational activities within the State.”26  It “is the nation’s most 
 
 20. See Roy G. Finch, The Story of the New York State Canals: Governor Dewitt Clin-
ton’s Dream, NEW YORK STATE CANALS, available at http://www.canals.ny.gov/cculture/ 
history/finch/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
 21. See id. 
 22. CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 97 (1905), availa-
ble at http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/cgisirsi/T2UFEVhehH/NYSL/86450122/503/82982. 
 23. Green, supra note 10, at 1169 (citing CAROL SHERIFF, THE ARTIFICIAL RIVER 80-81 
(Arthur Wang ed., 1996)). 
 24. Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823). 
 25. Regents examinations in selected high school subjects were authorized in 1876. See 
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, History of Regent’s Examinations 1865-1987,  http://www.p12.nys 
ed.gov/osa/hsgen/archive/rehistory.htm (last visited, Jan. 3, 2010). The exams were respon-
sive to the perceived “danger of superficiality and misdirection in the range of secondary 
study.” Id. (quoting Dr. John E. Bradley). 
 26. New York State Board of Regents, NYSED.GOV, http://www.regents.nysed.gov/ 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (emphasis added). 
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comprehensive and unified educational system.”27  While it traces its ante-
cedents to a 1784 statute establishing the Regents as a corporation empo-
wered to govern Columbia College (now University) and subsequently es-
tablished colleges, the provenance of the University of the State of New 
York is even more fascinating. 
This unique university was not a single institution of higher learning as at 
Paris or Oxford.  Rather, it served largely as a way of governing schools, 
colleges and universities in a centralized, secular system of state control.  
In addition, it controlled admission to higher education through the re-
gents examinations given to secondary school children.  This type of uni-
versity had been advocated unsuccessfully in France for over two hundred 
years.28 
It is “no mere coincidence” that Napoleon’s University of France (1808) 
took similar form.29  “If France may claim to have given New York the 
ideal of a symmetrical state system of learning, New York may claim to 
have returned to France the practical form of such a system, in its all-
inclusive university corporation.”30 
This Article is not about dirigisme in education, but rather about the con-
flict between the duty of New York courts to enforce the State’s guarantees 
of private property rights31 and its deference to centralized control of own-
ership and direction of land use.  The New York and Federal constitutions 
both state: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”32  The courts of New York have generally interpreted this 
provision quite broadly in favor of the government, a trend continued since 
my last review a dozen years ago, in connection with the Court of Appeals’ 
1997 quartet of regulatory takings cases.33 
 
 27. Id.  The University: 
consists of all elementary, secondary, and postsecondary educational institutions, 
libraries, museums, public broadcasting, records and archives, professions, Voca-
tional and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities, and such other 
institutions, organizations, and agencies as may be admitted to The University.  
The concept of The University of the State of New York is a broad term encom-
passing all the institutions, both public and private, offering education in the State. 
Id. 
 28. Roland G. Paulston, French Influence in American Institutions of Higher Learning, 
1784-1825, 8 HIST. EDUC. Q. 229, 236 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. at 237-38. 
 30. Id. 
 31. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (McKinney 2010). 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). 
 33. Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating From the “Rule 
of Law,” 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345 (1998) [hereinafter Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Tak-
ings Quartet]; see also infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text (supplying a brief sum-
mary). 
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At the time of the American Revolution, the immemorial power of the 
sovereign to condemn private property for the health, safety, and welfare of 
the people devolved upon the State.  “The right to take private property for 
public purposes does not depend upon any express provision in the charter 
of government, but is an inherent attribute of sovereignty existing in every 
independent state.”34  With the creation of entities like the Erie Canal 
Commission in 1817, New York State took an active role in promoting 
commerce and economic growth through their direction and instigation of 
the means of that growth.35 
Though not all were Federalists,36 the leading politicians of New York 
State shared Alexander Hamilton’s belief in the end for strong government 
direction and support of industry.  In his major economic work, Report on 
Manufactures,37 Hamilton strongly argued against Adam Smith’s perspec-
tive and the ability of free markets to effectively produce economic 
growth.38  In Manufactures, Hamilton argued as an alternative to the unre-
gulated free market that an integrated agricultural and industrial economy, 
in which the government promotes infrastructure development (canals and 
roads, at that time) aiding in the growth and prosperity of the populace, 
speeds technological growth and improves national security.39  This eco-
nomic perspective inspired adherents throughout the nation, but nowhere 
more than in Hamilton’s home state, New York, where the role of govern-
ment in improving the “public good” was fully enshrined even at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century.40 
In New York State, a massive expansion of the breadth and use of emi-
nent domain powers for projects such as the Erie Canal and subsequent in-
frastructure projects was justified based upon the potential public benefits 
such projects were expected to provide.41  Specific changes such as an alte-
ration in the judicial definition of the term public use (as applied from the 
Fifth Amendment) were introduced, with the term being “narrowly con-
 
 34. Heyward v. New York, 7 N.Y. 314 (1852). 
 35. See GERARD KOEPPEL, BOND OF UNION: BUILDING THE ERIE CANAL AND AMERICAN 
EMPIRE 3 (2009). 
 36. Governor Dewitt Clinton, the driving force behind the Erie Canal, was a Democratic 
Republican. 
 37. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in 10 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 303 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966), available at http://www. 
constitution.org/ah/rpt_manufactures.pdf. 
 38. See AMBROSE & MARTIN, supra note 17, at 192. 
 39. See generally Hamilton, supra note 37. 
 40. KNOTT, supra note 18, at 43, 54, 56, 83, 108. 
 41. Green, supra note 10, at 1172-73 (citing Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 341-42 
(N.Y. Ch. 1823)). 
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strued before the canal, [but] after the canal . . . construed broadly.”42  The 
preeminence of economic development interests was continued at the ex-
pense of individual property interests in the remedies available for a wrong-
ful taking as well, as “even when construction companies took property 
without a state or court order for use in the canal’s construction, they were 
required to pay damages rather than return the property.”43 
The phrase “Empire State” came into general usage as a nickname for 
New York upon the completion of the Erie Canal.44  The completion of that 
waterway provided the first direct waterborne link between the Hudson 
River at Albany and the Port of New York, and the rich agricultural regions 
of western New York and the Great Lakes.  This made the state the ideal 
conduit for trade between east and west, and thus the keystone of a North 
American “empire.”45  As time went on and the U.S. economy shifted from 
overwhelmingly agricultural to largely industrial, this transport corridor, 
augmented by the New York Central Railroad and, later, the New York 
State Thruway, fed economic development in upstate New York and the 
Midwest, carrying steel, coal, and the finished products of heavy industry.  
The change in economic focus did not, however, change New York State’s 
means of promoting it, and the dirigiste philosophy that had supported the 
growth of trade in agriculture simply was adapted to industry.46 
The prototypical twentieth century dirigiste administrator was New 
York’s Robert Moses, the eternal proponent of government-directed infra-
structure development.47  Coming to prominence in the 1920s and 1930s, 
Moses believed adamantly in his vision of the form economic development 
in New York City and other parts of the state should take, and he used gov-
ernment taking power to shape the outcomes of that vision.48  In place of 
the piecemeal development of small businesses and houses in neighbor-
hoods like the South Bronx, Moses advocated for and imperiously achieved 
the creation of a centrally planned network of highways and bridges.  This, 
 
 42. Id. at 1171 (citing Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 1167. 
 45. Id. at 1169. 
 46. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).  In this 
staple of first-year property and torts classes, the Court of Appeals refused to grant the tradi-
tional remedy of injunction against a cement plant that emitted dust and noise to the detri-
ment of neighbors.  Instead, it awarded permanent damages on the grounds that the defen-
dant’s investment in the plant and the number of its employees made that use more valuable. 
 47. See Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political 
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2019 (2007). 
 48. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 4-9 (1974) (magisterial biography of Moses). 
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in his view, enhanced overall economic development and the “public 
good.”49 
The “public private hybrid” development model was chiefly Moses’ in-
vention.50  He used the Tri-Borough Bridge Authority, which had ill-
defined powers, to help direct massive amounts of government money into 
the projects which he supported, essentially turning him into the man with 
control of the money to finance infrastructure improvements, which no oth-
er person or authority in the state had.51  Moses’ displacement of many 
people and businesses and his brusque personal style resulted in vehement 
protests and eventually caused the city government to turn against him.52 
Despite Moses’ fall, the mindset in favor of large-scale development 
through eminent domain takings, against the wishes of property owners and 
masterminded by quasi-public organizations, remained undisturbed.  A 
classic case illustrating this mindset is the ill-fated World Trade Center 
Project, which had its genesis in concerns after the Second World War 
about New York City retaining its financial leadership in a world of globa-
lized commerce.53  The movers behind the project were New York Gover-
nor Nelson A. Rockefeller and his brother, Chase Manhattan Bank Chair-
man David Rockefeller.  The Port of New York Authority was brought in 
because it possessed bonding power, “mean[ing] that Rockefeller did not 
have to carry the enormous cost of the project on his state budget.”54  Also, 
the Port Authority had the power of eminent domain, which was exercised 
against a neighborhood of small shop owners, and which was upheld by the 
Court of Appeals in the highly publicized case of Courtesy Sandwich Shop, 
Inc. v. Port of New York Authority.55  Dirigisme in New York remains alive 
and well today, as demonstrated by the Atlantic Yards Project56 and similar 
 
 49. Id. at 850. 
 50. Nasim Farjad, Condemnation Friendly or Land Use Wise? A Broad Interpretation of 
the Public Use Requirement Works Well for New York City, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1121, 
1155 (2007) (quoting Eleanor Randolph, Editorial, Robert Moses, Builder, Left Behind His 
Power Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at A26). 
 51. CARO, supra note 48, at 386-92, 617-18. 
 52. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 
(1961).  Jacobs herself had been radicalized by Moses’ plan to run a highway through 
Washington Square Park. Id. 
 53. See Mary L. Clark, Lessons From the World Trade Center for Open Space Planning 
Generally and Boston’s Big Dig Specifically, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 301, 301-02 
(2005). 
 54. PAUL GOLDBERGER, UP FROM ZERO: POLITICS, ARCHITECTURE, AND THE REBUILDING 
OF NEW YORK 22 (2004). 
 55. 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963). 
 56. See generally Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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ventures throughout the State, sponsored by its redevelopment agency, the 
Empire State Development Corporation.57 
Illustrative of this tendency toward centralism in land use and develop-
ment is the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA),58 which 
requires review of “virtually all discretionary acts taken by State agencies 
and local governments in New York.”59  SEQRA encompasses not only ac-
tions undertaken by government agencies or involving government fund-
ing, but also those private projects that require agency approvals.60  The 
Act has been interpreted as to require detailed review of the economic im-
pact that a commercial enterprise may have on neighborhood character.61 
Thus, the Court of Appeals has held that the “potential acceleration of 
the displacement of local residents and businesses is a secondary long-term 
effect on population patterns, community goals, and neighborhood charac-
ter such that [SEQRA] requires these impacts on the environment to be 
considered in an environmental analysis.”62  In cases where there is a go-
vernmental “larger plan” for development, the cumulative impact of all 
other pending proposals must be taken into account in the review of any 
particular development application.63 
In recent years, upstate New York has fallen on hard economic times,64 
and manufacturing in New York City has declined, with corresponding 
heavy reliance on the financial and service sectors.65  The relative decline 
of New York State is illustrated by census data: the 1960 census resulted in 
New York having forty-one representatives in Congress, while Florida had 
 
 57. For list and summary, see Major Development Projects, EMPIRE STATE DEV., http:// 
www.empire.state.ny.us/Subsidiaries_Projects.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 58. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW art. 8 (McKinney 2010). 
 59. John F. Shea, Environmental Law and Regulation in New York, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 223, 226 (1997). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Soc’y of the Plastics Indus. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 
1991). 
 62. Chinese Staff & Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176, 180-81 (N.Y. 
1986). 
 63. Long Island Pine Barrens Soc’y, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Brookhaven, 606 N.E.2d 
1373, 1378 (N.Y. 1992) (quoting Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, 512 N.E.2d 
526, 531 (N.Y. 1987)). 
 64. State & County QuickFacts: Buffalo (City), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3611000.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (show-
ing the decline in population and a median household income almost half that of New York 
State as a whole). 
 65. May 2009 State Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: New York, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (last modified Apr. 6, 2010), http://www. 
bls.gov/oes/current/oes_ny.htm (showing the great majority of New York State workers are 
no longer employed in industry). 
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twelve representatives.66  As a result of the 2010 census, both states have 
twenty-seven representatives.  California supplanted New York as the most 
populous state in the 1970 census, with Texas also surpassing New York’s 
population in 1994.67  Florida is expected to supplant New York in 2015 as 
the nation’s third most populous state.68  The dirigiste system seems to be 
in danger not due to any successful attempts to tame it or do away with it, 
but simply due to a shift in the economic needs of the state and a failure to 
adjust accordingly. 
The declining relative importance of manufacturing in American cities, 
together with tremendous growth in the importance of information,69 sug-
gest a change in focus for the State’s dirigiste inclination.  While eminent 
domain was the lynchpin of the Atlantic Yards project,70 it also was em-
ployed to obtain the site for the new headquarters building of an important 
information purveyor, the New York Times.71  Given the interlocking of 
economic actors and interests, it is perhaps not a coincidence that The New 
York Times has been an avid booster of the controversial use of condemna-
tion for Atlantic Yards and Columbia University.72 
 
 66. KAREN MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2KBR/01-7, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTION-
MENT, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2k 
br01-7.pdf. 
 67. The 2011 Statistical Abstract: The National Data Book, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http: 
//www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/population.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 68. PAUL R. CAMPBELL, POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PPL-47, POPULATION 
PROJECTIONS FOR STATES BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1995 TO 2025 (1996), 
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/ppl47.html. 
 69. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 70. See infra Part II.C. 
 71. See Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference 
to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards Project, 42 URB. LAW. 
287, 369 (2010). 
 72. See id. (noting that The New York Times Company partnered on its midtown head-
quarters building with Forest City Ratner, the developer of Atlantic Yards).  The New York 
Times coverage, in turn, was not critical of the Atlantic Yards Project. Id.  The New York 
Times also editorialized that the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the use of eminent 
domain for Atlantic Yards in Goldstein was the “right decision,” and that the Appellate Di-
vision’s opinion in Kaur, finding the Manhattanville Project advocated by Columbia Uni-
versity to be pretextual was “misguided[]” and “weakly reasoned.” See Editorial, Eminent 
Domain in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A30.  Most recently, a New York Times 
architectural review has lavished praise on the new Columbia science building that will 
serve as the gateway to the campus extension that was the subject of Kaur as “superb archi-
tecture” and a means of “reinforcing the university’s public mission.” Nicolai Ouroussoff, A 
Building Forms a Bridge Between a University’s Past and Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2011, at C2. 
It is also, not incidentally, a work of healing. Seen in the context of Columbia’s 
often tense relationship with its Harlem neighbors, including recent battles over its 
plans to build a new 17-acre campus in West Harlem, the building is a gleaming 
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The mindset that first flowered in the governance structure for Columbia 
College soon after Independence may have reached its culmination in the 
partnership between the State and what is now Columbia University.  In 
2010, the New York Court of Appeals endorsed, without effective qualifi-
cation, that the State’s imprimatur permits it to appropriate parcels belong-
ing to its neighbors and then re-convey them to Columbia.73 
In a statement released shortly after his recent swearing-in as governor, 
Andrew M. Cuomo pledged to serve the people of New York “and make it 
the Empire State once again.”74  That promise hints that the State’s inter-
ventions in the economy will continue and perhaps grow.  If so, reconciling 
the State’s role in urban revitalization with transparency, the prevention of 
crony capitalism, and private property rights will become more important 
than ever.  It is incumbent upon the New York Court of Appeals to make 
its review of litigation arising from this process more conceptually sound 
and practically astute. 
II.  TAKINGS AND PUBLIC USE LAW 
A. Takings Law 
The right of the State to take private property for public use is an 
attribute of sovereignty that does not depend on any constitutional provi-
sion.75  The U.S. Constitution says, “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”76  The U.S. Supreme Court de-
scribed the Takings Clause as a “tacit recognition of a pre-existing power 
to take private property for public use, rather than a grant of a new pow-
er.”77  The corresponding New York provision is in substance exactly the 
same: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation.”78 
 
physical expression of the university’s desire to bridge the divide between the in-
sular world of the campus and the community beyond its walls. 
Id. 
 73. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub 
nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 74. Danny Hakim, Cuomo is Sworn In as New York’s Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 
2010, at A13. 
 75. Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923); Heyward v. 
New York, 7 N.Y. 314, 325 (1852); see also Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 183 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1962) (noting that the power of eminent domain antedates the 
state and federal Constitutions, survived their adoption, and is subject only to restrictions 
that takings shall be for authorized public use and that just compensation be paid to owners). 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 77. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946). 
 78. N.Y. CONST. § 7(a). 
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The exigencies of government do not permit uncompensated takings, 
even if government has great need.  Justice Holmes warned in the seminal 
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that “[w]e are in danger of forget-
ting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not 
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu-
tional way of paying for the change.”79  Likewise, the New York Court of 
Appeals warned that “no matter how pressing a problem may be, private 
property may not be so interfered with as to amount to taking without com-
pensation even for public purpose or to advance general welfare.”80  Other 
cases reinforced this admonition.81  Within these constraints, however, the 
New York Court of Appeals has stated that the power of eminent domain is 
legislative, and it is the legislature that determines the necessity for and 
time and manner of its exercise.82 
In 1835, the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York, the State’s high-
est court of law at that time, held in the case of In re Albany Street83 that a 
statute authorizing the condemnation of an entire lot was invalid when only 
part of the land was required for the establishment of a street and the lan-
downer did not consent. 
If this provision . . . is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may, 
against the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only a part is 
required for public use, and the residue to be applied to private use, it as-
sumes a power which, with all respect, the legislature did not possess.  
The Constitution, by authorizing the appropriation of private property to 
public use, impliedly declares, that for any other use, private property 
shall not be taken from one and applied to the use of another.  It is in vi-
olation of natural right, and if it is not in violation of the letter of the Con-
stitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be supported.84 
In another possible reflection of John Locke’s famous declaration “their 
lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name property,”85 
the Supreme Court of Judicature declared in 1843, in Taylor v. Porter & 
Ford:86 
 
 79. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
 80. Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 275 N.E.2d 585, 588 (N.Y. 1971). 
 81. See, e.g., In re Cheesebrough, 78 N.Y. 232 (1879) (holding that, despite the State’s 
interest in the health of its citizens, a permanent sewer could not be installed on private land 
without payment of just compensation). 
 82. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp. v. Johnson, 154 N.E.2d 550, 555 (N.Y. 1958). 
 83. 11 Wend. 149, 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). 
 84. Id. at 151. 
 85. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERA-
TION 155 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690). 
 86. 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
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It will be seen that the same measure of protection against legislative en-
croachment is extended to life, liberty and property; and if the latter can 
be taken without a forensic trial and judgment, there is no security for the 
others.  If the legislature can take the property of A and transfer it to B, 
they can take A himself, and either shut him up in prison, or put him to 
death. But none of these things can be done by mere legislation.  There 
must be “due process of law.”87 
During the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court at first required 
compensation only where the state divested the landowner of title,88 but 
subsequently extended the concept to instances where governmental ac-
tions worked a permanent appropriation.89  However, it drew the line at 
cases where the regulation was an application of the police power, designed 
to prevent harm.90  Likewise, New York courts have recognized that rea-
sonable land use restrictions imposed under the police power do not consti-
tute takings merely because the land’s value is substantially reduced.91 
In 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,92 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held for the first time that regulation of property use, as well as physical 
appropriation, could require just compensation under the Takings Clause, if 
the regulation went “too far.”93  Pennsylvania Coal remains “the founda-
tion” of regulatory takings law,94 and its’ “too far” language has been 
adopted in New York.95 
The most general test employed by the Supreme Court in determining 
whether a regulatory taking has occurred is contained in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.96  That case, decided in 1978, pro-
vided for an ad hoc, multi-factor balancing test.  Penn Central remains the 
 
 87. Id. at 147. 
 88. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Ni-
neteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57 (1999). 
 89. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (land above government dam per-
manently inundated). 
 90. See, e.g., Mulger v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (loss of value in brewery building 
after prohibition imposed). 
 91. Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank v. City of New York, 829 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007). 
 92. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 7-
7(b)(1) (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS]. 
 93. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 94. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting) (the case was decided by a 5-4 vote). 
 95. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Vill. of Fairport, 446 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1982) (“If the regulation goes too far, the municipality’s action will be treated as a public 
taking for which compensation is required.”). 
 96. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
EAGLE_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011  7:01 PM 
2011] PUBLIC USE IN THE DIRIGISTE TRADITION 1037 
“polestar” of the Court’s takings jurisprudence.97 Not subjected to Penn 
Central balancing are “categorical” takings, in which land is deprived of all 
economic use,98 or instances of permanent physical occupation, however 
slight.99  The Court reiterated and summarized these rules in 2005, in Lin-
gle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.100 
In New York, the principal Court of Appeals’ application of Penn Cen-
tral has been a quartet of cases decided in 1997: Basile v. Town of Sou-
thampton,101 Kim v. City of New York,102 Gazza v. New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation,103 and Anello v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals of the Village of Dobbs Ferry.104  “Viewed as a whole, this ‘tak-
ings quartet’ makes it significantly easier for the State of New York and its 
subdivisions to resist the takings claims of private landowners.”105 
In Anello, the Court of Appeals held that the challenge to a permit denial 
occasioned by a “steep slope” ordinance “must fail,” since the “restriction 
thus encumbered petitioner’s title from the outset of her ownership and its 
enforcement does not constitute a governmental taking of any property in-
terest owned by her.”106  In Gazza, a development variance required by a 
wetlands ordinance antecedent to the plaintiff’s purchase was denied.107  
The Court of Appeals declared that “[t]he relevant property interests owned 
by the petitioner are defined by those State laws enacted and in effect at the 
time he took title.”108  Alternatively, petitioner’s “reasonable expectations” 
at the time of his purchase “were not affected when the property remained 
restricted” and that “the alleged diminution of value and limitation of prop-
erty uses caused by the environmental regulations would fall well within 
constitutional boundaries.”109 
In Basile, tidal lands were subject both to wetlands regulations and to a 
covenant whereby plaintiff’s predecessor in title recited that the parcel 
“may consist of wetlands and may not be suitable for erection of a dwel-
 
 97. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 98. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 99. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982). 
 100. 544 U.S. 528, 536-40 (2005). 
 101. 678 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1997). 
 102. 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997). 
 103. 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997). 
 104. 678 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1997). 
 105. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet, supra note 33, at 346. 
 106. Anello, 678 N.E.2d at 871 (stating that a “steep slope” ordinance prevented petition-
er from building a one-family dwelling on a parcel in order to promote the orderly develop-
ment of land with excessively steep slope areas). 
 107. Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1040. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1043. 
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ling,” and no building shall be erected “unless and until” the parcel is “ap-
proved as a building lot” by the Town.110  The Court of Appeals noted that 
“‘[t]he wetlands regulations at issue in this case did not deprive claimant of 
any interest in the property that had not already been encumbered’ by vir-
tue of the covenants.”111  Finally, in Kim, owners of a gas station claimed a 
physical taking by dint of city construction of a high earthen wall filling 
some of their parcel and blocking access to some of the rest.  The court de-
cided that they were put on notice of a change in the adjoining avenue’s 
grade by a map filed in the county engineer’s office a decade before, and 
that the city’s actions saved them the cost of a similar structure to provide 
the avenue with the required lateral support.112 
More recently, in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State,113 the Court of 
Appeals summarized its regulatory takings jurisprudence, borrowing heavi-
ly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc.114  “Governmental regulation of private property,” it said, “effects a 
taking if it is ‘so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropria-
tion or ouster.’”115  “To determine whether a regulation is proper or goes 
‘too far,’ a court must consider the factors identified in Penn Central.  The 
primary, but not exclusive Penn Central inquiry turns on ‘the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expec-
tations.’”116 
B. Public Use 
In Kelo v. City of New London,117 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld, as 
consistent with the Public Use Clause,118 the condemnation of sound resi-
dences for retransfer for private urban revitalization.  In explaining the 
Court’s holding, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion was careful to adum-
brate that “it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the 
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party 
B, even though A is paid just compensation.”119  “A purely private taking 
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would 
 
 110. Basile v. Town of Southampton, 678 N.E.2d 489, 490 (N.Y. 1997). 
 111. Id. at 491 (internal citation omitted). 
 112. Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 313-15 (N.Y. 1997). 
 113. 840 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 2005). 
 114. 544 U.S. 528, 536-40 (2005). 
 115. 840 N.E.2d at 84 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537). 
 116. Id. at 84-85 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539). 
 117. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 118. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 119. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. 
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serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.”120  
The Public Use Clause has its genesis in substantive due process, which 
permeates the Court’s early discussion in Calder v. Bull: 
[A] law that takes property from A and gives it to B: It is against all rea-
son and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; 
and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.  The genius, 
the nature, and the spirit, of our State Governments, amount to a prohibi-
tion of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and rea-
son forbid them.121 
Similarly, the New York Supreme Court stated, “[t]he people cannot, as 
long as the Constitutions of the state of New York and of the United States 
remain in their present form, take private property for use of other than the 
people, even if they pay just compensation.”122 
In Taylor v. Porter & Ford,123 although the plaintiff succeeded in pre-
venting a road from crossing his property without permission, the judge 
opined that “the legislature is not supreme,” and could not “transfer the 
property of A to B.”124 
I shall not be understood as saying that a trial and judgment are necessary 
in exercising the right of eminent domain.  When private property is taken 
for public use, the only restriction is, that just compensation shall be made 
to the owner.  But when one man wants the property of another, I mean to 
say that the legislature cannot aid him in making the acquisition.125 
Other than “law and reason,” two factors militate against condemnation 
of property from private party A solely for the benefit of private party B.  
The first is injury to A, who loses the subjective value he or she places on 
ownership above fair market value.  Since it is impractical to pay condem-
nees their asserted subjective value of their land, the Supreme Court has 
decided that payment of fair market value is the measure of “just compen-
sation.”126  The sentimental value of a family long residing in a house and 
the goodwill and customization of premises used by business are familiar 
examples of uncompensated losses, since “market value is not the value 
that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value 
that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”127  That subjective value 
 
 120. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984). 
 121. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).  
 122. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 279 N.Y.S. 299, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935). 
 123. 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
 124. Id. at 144. 
 125. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). 
 127. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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represents a real loss to owners, however, as does the uncompensated costs 
in time and money expended in searching for substitute premises and mov-
ing.  For these reasons, “[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is there-
fore not full compensation.”128  A separate reason for disallowing condem-
nations producing purely private benefit is the inevitable corruption and 
undermining of the fabric of a democratic society that would result.129 
At least as early as 1837, New York’s highest court ruled that private 
parties could derive incidental benefit from the exercise of eminent do-
main,130 a point made explicitly in its 1878 case of In re Ryers.131  New 
York has long given great discretion to legislative decisions.  In 1835, in 
Varick v. Smith,132 the Chancery Court of New York noted the primacy of 
the legislature in deciding what constituted a public purpose.  In connection 
with the disposition of waters from a dam constructed to facilitate a state 
canal, it stated “the legislature is the sole judge as to the expediency of 
making police regulations, interfering with the natural rights of the citizens 
of the state; and as to the expediency of exercising the right of eminent 
domain, for any public purposes.”133  A 1914 Court of Appeals case held 
that it is not objectionable that a grant of the right of eminent domain origi-
nated in and was designed to subserve private interests, so long as the use is 
public.134 
Adopting a broad construction of the term “public use,” the New York 
Court of Appeals held, in Denihan Industries v. O’Dwyer,135 that “an inci-
dental private benefit, such as a reasonable proportion of commercial 
space, is not enough to invalidate a project which has for its primary object 
a public purpose.”136 
In defining permissible “public use,” the Supreme Court’s Kelo opinion 
stated the two conflicting views of the subject.  The narrow view defined 
“public use” as “use by the public,” which meant use by the general public, 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Prop-
erty Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 78-79 (2002) (noting the relationship 
between property and liberty). 
 130. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (1837) (upholding delegation of 
eminent domain power to railroads with incidental benefit to them). 
 131. 72 N.Y. 1, 7-8 (1878). 
 132. 5 Paige Ch. 137 (N.Y. Ch. 1835). 
 133. Id. at 137. 
 134. Oneonta Light & Power Co. v. Schwarzenbach, 150 N.Y.S. 76, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1914), aff’d, 114 N.E. 1075 (N.Y. 1916). 
 135. 99 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 1951). 
 136. Id. at 238. 
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government agencies, and common carriers that were heavily regulated and 
obligated to serve the public.137 
[W]hile many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed “use by the 
public” as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily 
eroded over time.  Not only was the “use by the public” test difficult to 
administer (e.g., what proportion of the public need have access to the 
property? at what price?), but it proved to be impractical given the diverse 
and always evolving needs of society.138 
Instead, Justice Stevens stated, “when this Court began applying the 
Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced 
the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public pur-
pose.’”139 
Justice Stevens recognized that the broad “public purpose” test he pro-
pounded was susceptible to abuse.  Situations where a “private purpose was 
afoot” could be “confronted if and when they arise.  They do not warrant 
the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use.”140 
In the Court of Appeals’ recent decisions in Goldstein v. New York State 
Urban Development Corp.,141 and Kaur v. New York State Urban Devel-
opment Corp.,142 the possibility of abuse indeed has arisen.  That problem 
is exacerbated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s hazy jurisprudence of “pretex-
tuality,” and by daunting procedural impediments to ascertaining whether 
that condition exists. 
C. Maximum Deference in Goldstein and Kaur 
The principal New York public use case decided since the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Kelo decision143 was Goldstein v. New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corp.144  There, the Court of Appeals upheld the condemnation of 
private parcels to facilitate construction of Atlantic Yards, a 22-acre mixed-
use development in downtown Brooklyn proposed by private developer 
Bruce Ratner.145  According to the court’s summary: 
 
 137. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 480. 
 140. Id. at 487 (internal citations omitted). 
 141. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 142. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 143. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 144. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 145. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 71, at 288 (providing detailed account of the politics, 
social dynamics, and economics of the Atlantic Yards project). 
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The project is to involve, in its first phase, construction of a sports arena 
to house the NBA Nets franchise, as well as various infrastructure im-
provements—most notably reconfiguration and modernization of the 
Vanderbilt Yards rail facilities and access upgrades to the subway trans-
portation hub already present at the site. The project will also involve 
construction of a platform spanning the rail yards and connecting portions 
of the neighborhood now separated by the rail cut.  Atop this platform are 
to be situated, in a second phase of construction, numerous high rise 
buildings and some eight acres of open, publicly accessible landscaped 
space.  The 16 towers planned for the project will serve both commercial 
and residential purposes.  They are slated to contain between 5,325 and 
6,430 dwelling units, more than a third of which are to be affordable ei-
ther for low and/or middle income families.146 
The project was challenged on the grounds that the Atlantic Yards 
project was intended to facilitate private economic gain, albeit with possi-
ble incidental public benefit.147  The Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
the alleged blight in the project area “did not begin to approach in severity 
the dire circumstances of urban slum dwelling” present in New York City 
Housing Authority v. Muller,148 the 1936 case in which it first recognized 
blight as grounds for condemnation.149  Nevertheless, it stated that subse-
quent cases upheld blight condemnations where “a substantial part of the 
area” was “‘substandard and insanitary’ by modern tests.”150 
“Gradually, as the complexities of urban conditions became better unders-
tood, it has become clear that the areas eligible for such renewal are not 
limited to ‘slums’ as that term was formerly applied, and that, among oth-
er things, economic underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to 
the public sufficient to make their removal cognizable as a public pur-
pose.”151 
The court stressed that “lending precise content” to general terms such 
as “blight” “has not been, and may not be, primarily a judicial exercise,” 
and that the Legislature had left the “actual specification” of public uses 
 
 146. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166. 
 147. Id. at 170. 
 148. 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936). 
Enormous economic loss results directly from the necessary expenditure of public 
funds to maintain health and hospital services for afflicted slum dwellers and to 
war against crime and immorality. Indirectly there is an equally heavy capital loss 
and a diminishing return in taxes because of the areas blighted by the existence of 
the slums. 
Id. at 154. 
 149. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 171. 
 150. Id. (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953)). 
 151. Id. at 172 (quoting Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 
1975)). 
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“largely . . . to quasi-legislative administrative agencies.”152  “It is only 
where there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether 
an area is blighted, that judges may substitute their views as to the adequa-
cy with which the public purpose of blight removal has been made out for 
those of the legislatively designated agencies . . . .”153 
Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion challenged both the “self-serving” de-
termination by the State redevelopment agency that petitioners lived in a 
“blighted” neighborhood and the majority’s deference to that finding.154  
The legal implications of the majority opinion and dissent in Goldstein are 
analyzed elsewhere in the Article.155 
Soon after Goldstein was decided, the Appellate Division held, in Kaur 
v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,156 that condemnation by the 
Empire State Development Corporation for the purpose of extending the 
Columbia University campus in West Harlem did violate the public use re-
quirement.  While Goldstein primarily discussed the extent to which urban 
disamenities constituted “blight” under New York law, the Appellate Divi-
sion in Kaur described the blight designation as “mere sophistry”157 and 
approached the case primarily in the context of pretext. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ESDC’s “findings of blight 
and determination that the condemnation of petitioners’ property qualified 
as a ‘land use improvement project’ were rationally based and entitled to 
deference.”158  The court noted that in Goldstein it had “reaffirmed the 
long-standing doctrine that the role of the Judiciary is limited in reviewing 
findings of blight in eminent domain proceedings.”159  It restated the “ob-
jective data utilized by ESDC,” and that, given the Court of Appeals 
precedent, the Appellate Division’s de novo review of the record was “im-
proper.”160 
It concluded that, “[o]n the ‘record upon which the ESDC determination 
was based and by which we are bound’ it cannot be said that ESDC’s find-
ing of blight was irrational or baseless.”161 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 186 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 155. See infra Part III.C. 
 156. 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 157. Id. at 10. 
 158. 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010). 
 159. Id. at 730. 
 160. Id. at 731. 
 161. Id. (quoting Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 166 (N.Y. 
2009)) (citing Levine v. New York State Liquor Auth., 245 N.E.2d 804 (N.Y. 1969)). 
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The Appellate Division also had held that the alternative basis upon 
which the Manhattanville Project could be upheld, that it was a “civic 
project,” could not be met because the expansion was of a private universi-
ty.162  The Court of Appeals rejected this distinction as lacking statutory 
support,163 adding that “the advancement of higher education is the quin-
tessential example of a ‘civic purpose.’”164 
III.  VITIATION OF PUBLIC USE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
At its outset, this Article postulated that the combination of Kelo and 
Kaur is worse than a crime; it is a blunder.  The present section explores 
the “crime” itself and why the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kelo v. 
City of New London,165 as brought to fruition in Kaur v. New York State 
Urban Development Corp.,166 effectively reads the Public Use Clause out 
of the United States and New York State Constitutions.167  The subsequent 
section discusses why this development constitutes a blunder from a public 
policy perspective.168 
A. Kelo Demonstrates the Need for a Limiting Principle 
In Kelo,169 the Supreme Court found that the condemnation of a sound 
moderate- and middle-income residential neighborhood for retransfer for 
private urban revitalization, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Public 
Use Clause.  The Court specifically rejected the “narrow” interpretation of 
public use, which limits eminent domain to instances of intended use by the 
general public, a government agency, or a highly regulated common carrier 
obligated to serve the public.170  Instead, it adopted a “broad” view that 
equates “public use” with “public purpose.”171 
The problem with the broad view is that “public purpose” is an indeter-
minate term.  Justice O’Connor, who wrote the principal opinion for the 
 
 162. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 163. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 733-34 (N.Y. 2010). 
 164. Id. at 734. 
 165. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 166. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”); N.Y. CONST. § 7(a) (“Private property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation.”). 
 168. See infra Part IV. 
 169. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 170. Id. at 479. 
 171. Id. at 479-80. See also supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
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four dissenters,172 earlier had stated in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid-
kiff173 that “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope 
of a sovereign’s police powers.”174  In Kelo, she drew back from the 
sweeping implications of that formulation and from Justice Douglas’ simi-
lar earlier proclamation in Berman v. Parker that “[o]nce the object is with-
in the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of 
eminent domain is clear.  For the power of eminent domain is merely the 
means to the end.”175  Justice O’Connor distinguished those cases, noting 
that the “extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property in-
flicted affirmative harm on society.”176  She explained that the government 
responded to a blighted neighborhood that was injurious to health in Ber-
man, and to a dramatic concentration of land ownership in Midkiff.177  “Be-
cause each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that 
the property was turned over to private use.”178  In Kelo, however, the city 
never claimed that the petitioners’ “well-maintained homes are the source 
of any social harm.”179 
B. The Unsatisfactory Adoption of Pretextuality 
The Supreme Court’s Kelo analysis began by juxtaposing two “polar 
propositions.”180  While the State “may not take the property of A for the 
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is 
paid just compensation,” it “may transfer property from one private party to 
another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking.”181 
As a corollary to this proposition, the State cannot “take property under 
the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow 
a private benefit.”182  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo added 
that “[a] court applying rational basis review under the Public Use Clause 
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a 
 
 172. Id. at 494-505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Thomas). 
 173. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 174. Id. at 240. 
 175. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 176. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 177. Id. at 498-99. 
 178. Id. at 500. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 477. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 478. 
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particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public bene-
fits.”183 
Kelo is the first case in which the Supreme Court has endorsed the “no-
tion of a ‘pretext’ claim.”184  Why did the Court adopt a standard based on 
intent, and is that standard workable? 
1. Why Should Motive Matter? 
“Pretextuality” refers to the proffer of an ostensible motive for conduct 
in order to hide the speaker’s actual motive.  There are many areas in which 
motive is important.  The criminal law, which focuses on punishment, natu-
rally is concerned with moral culpability.  “The late Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes once pointed out the distinction between criminal and non-criminal 
intent: ‘Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being 
kicked.’”185  On the other hand, injury to property is the purview of the law 
of tort, where rectification and indemnification is the focus and not pu-
nishment of the party causing the harm.  This point was well articulated in 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo: 
Even if there were a practical way to isolate the motives behind a given 
taking, the gesture toward a purpose test is theoretically flawed.  If it is 
true that incidental public benefits from new private use are enough to en-
sure the “public purpose” in a taking, why should it matter, as far as the 
Fifth Amendment is concerned, what inspired the taking in the first place?  
How much the government does or does not desire to benefit a favored 
private party has no bearing on whether an economic development taking 
will or will not generate secondary benefit for the public.  And whatever 
the reason for a given condemnation, the effect is the same from the con-
stitutional perspective—private property is forcibly relinquished to new 
private ownership.186 
Justice O’Connor was correct, but the anomaly she describes was one 
she was complicit in establishing.  It was she who declared, “[o]ur polestar 
. . . remains the principles set forth in Penn Central,” the case wherein the 
Court substituted its ad hoc, multifactor test for regulations187 based heavi-
ly on expectations.188  Justice Stevens quoted her concurring opinion and 
its “polestar” formulation as persuasive to the Court that even the complete 
 
 183. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 184. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 185. United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Morisette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 n.9 (1952)). 
 186. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 502-03 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 187. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 188. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment Backed Expectations,” 
32 URB. LAW. 437, 439 (2000). 
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deprivation of all economic use for a substantial period of time should be 
judged under the flexible Penn Central formulation instead of under the 
Lucas standard.189  At its heart, Penn Central is not a takings test; it is a 
due process test.190  Due process concerns proportionality (ends-means 
analysis) and fairness.191 
In Armstrong v. United States,192 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the 
Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.”193  Penn Central quoted this language and 
immediately added that “this Court, quite simply, has been unable to devel-
op any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require 
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the gov-
ernment, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few per-
sons.”194  Subsequently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency,195 the Court referred to this dictum as the 
“Armstrong principle.”196 
When the government condemns or physically appropriates the property, 
the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed.  When, however, 
the owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation im-
poses restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or 
appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analy-
sis is more complex.197 
Tahoe-Sierra thus stated that the subtlety of analysis required to discern 
whether regulations are so severe that fairness requires just compensation 
makes categorical rules unsuitable and directs us back to the ad hoc, multi-
factor analysis of Penn Central.  There, the Court found that “factors that 
have particular significance” are the “economic impact of the regulation on 
 
 189. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
336-38 (2002). 
 190. See Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reap-
praisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1016-21 (2000); see also John D. Echeverria, The Takings 
Issue and the Due Process Clause, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 696 (1993) (“[I]n the course of de-
veloping the Takings Clause as a substantive constraint on property regulation, the Court, in 
ad hoc fashion, has incorporated into its takings analysis standards the Court formerly uti-
lized exclusively in its review of regulatory activities under the Due Process Clause.”). 
 191. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) 
(due process “expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness’”). 
 192. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 193. Id. at 49. 
 194. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 195. 535 U.S. 302 (1902). 
 196. Id. at 321. 
 197. Id. at 322 n.17. 
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the claimant,” whether it interferes with “distinct investment-backed expec-
tations,” and the “character of the governmental action.”198 
There are distinct advantages in the alternative of examining objective 
intent.  In Goldstein v. Pataki,199 for instance, the Second Circuit quoted an 
observation in a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia that “discerning the 
subjective motivation of [a legislative body] is, to be honest, almost always 
an impossible task. . . . To look for the sole purpose of even a single legis-
lator is probably to look for something that does not exist.”200  On the other 
hand, the opinion added that Justice Scalia prefaced his remark by noting 
that “it is possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the 
public good at which its provisions appear to be directed).”201 
Perhaps the Supreme Court predicates its public use jurisprudence on in-
tent for the same reason that it predicates its regulatory takings jurispru-
dence on intent.  Examinations of subjective motivation permit the Court to 
circumvent the direct questions that it must face under the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause.  Did the plaintiff own property?  Did the govern-
ment take the property?  Was just compensation paid?  The Court could es-
tablish bright line rules for deciding these questions, relying, for example, 
upon proposed objective standards such as the “independent economic via-
bility” standard for any “horizontally definable parcel,”202 or any set of 
property rights selected by the owner, so long as it is recognized as a 
“commercial unit” in a recognized market.203 
The Court in Penn Central did not define the “character of the regula-
tion” test, but merely illustrated it by observing that “[a] ‘taking’ may more 
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized 
as a physical invasion . . . than when interference arises from some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.”204  However, four years later, the Court held in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. that a permanent physical invasion 
constitutes a categorical taking without regard to the Penn Central balanc-
 
 198. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 199. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 200. Id. at 63 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)) (alteration in original). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking 
Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (1994) (“[A]ny horizontally definable parcel, con-
taining at least one economically viable use independent of the immediately surrounding 
land segments, loses all economic use due to government regulation.”). 
 203. See EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 92, § 7-7(e)(5), at 934 (noting that 
the term is adopted from U.C.C. § 2-608(1)). 
 204. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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ing test.205  Thus, the “character of the regulation” test was deprived of its 
only clear content.  It would seem, however, that unfairness is an aspect of 
its meaning. 
In American Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States,206 newly enacted 
statutes precluded one large, advanced, and specialized fishing ship from 
plying its trade, as if that one entry in a large fishing fleet “had been identi-
fied by name in the text of the acts.”207  The U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
stressed that the new law’s severity, essential retroactivity, and specific tar-
geting justified a finding that there was a regulatory taking under the “cha-
racter of the regulation” test.208  The Federal Circuit reversed on other 
grounds,209 and the point has not been definitively decided.  It might be 
that, as Professor Mark Fenster put it: 
Ultimately, the character factor serves as a judicial escape hatch. . . . A 
properly functionalist judge should assess the conflicting human values at 
stake in the litigation, appraise the social importance of existing 
precedent, consider all of the relevant evidence that would bring light to 
the conflict, and reject the use of abstract legal concepts that would direct 
the decision away from the particular dispute and the prevalent norms of 
social and commercial behavior in the relevant field. . . . To the extent 
that the character factor allows a judge to make this consideration explicit, 
it will enable her to more candidly decide the issue.210 
The Court chose to submit functional takings of property rights not in-
volving physical appropriation to the Penn Central test, in which the own-
er’s subjective “expectations” predominates,211 except when those turn out 
to be objectively unreasonable.212  Its justification for separate bodies of 
physical takings and regulatory takings law rests largely on its observation 
that the former “usually represent a greater affront to individual property 
rights.”213  It is hard to discern from that truism a valid Constitutional dis-
 
 205. 458 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1982). 
 206. 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (2001). 
 207. Id. at 51. 
 208. Id. at 46. 
 209. 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding fishing permits are not property). 
 210. Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 525, 575-76 (2009). 
 211. See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68, 85 (N.Y. 2005) 
(noting that the “primary, but not exclusive Penn Central inquiry turns on ‘the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
 212. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).  Then-Justice Rehn-
quist gave no explanation for his opinion’s change in terminology from Penn Central’s “dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations.” 
 213. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
324 (2002). 
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tinction.  Parenthetically, when it came to “just compensation,” the Court 
has rejected any attempt to measure subjective value and adopted a fair 
market value standard instead.214 
Similarly, “pretextuality” makes sense only as a fairness equivalent 
sounding in substantive due process.  It seems paradoxical that the Su-
preme Court has eschewed using substantive due process in property rights 
deprivations cases,215 while at the same time using light and ineffectual va-
riants of substantive due process as tests for uncompensated takings and 
takings not for public use. 
2. The Assumptions Underlying Pretext are Counterfactual 
In 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,216 a U.S. 
district court found that the justification given for the condemnation, the 
fabricated explanation that 99 Cents’ parcel was “blighted,” clearly was not 
the actual reason for the city’s act.  But, as I elaborate elsewhere,217 there 
was no showing that the city condemned 99 Cents’ parcel to enhance pri-
vate welfare at the expense of public benefit.  The parcel was condemned at 
the behest of 99 Cents’ competitor Costco, to which it was to be trans-
ferred.  As the trial court noted, the city viewed Costco as a lynchpin of its 
economic development plans, and was “fearful of Costo’s relocation to 
another city.”218  As Lancaster’s city attorney later told the Wall Street 
Journal, Costco provided ten times the sales tax revenues to the city that 99 
Cents did: “You tell me which was more important.”219 
Just as cultivated inscrutability might mask virtue as well as vice, pretex-
tuality might mask an agent’s desire to achieve public benefit.  It might be 
argued, correctly, that 99 Cents Only Stores would have been the “victim” 
of Costco’s apparent scheme to use extortion against the city to oust its 
competitor.  99 Cents Only Stores might have had a meritorious tort claim 
against Costco for interference with relational interests.220 
 
 214. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1945). 
 215. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). See generally Steven 
J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 
BYU L. REV. 899 [hereinafter Eagle, Property Tests]. 
 216. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed as moot, 60 F. App’x 123 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 217. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 63, 104-05 (2009). 
 218. 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. 
 219. Dean Starkman, More Courts Rule Cities Misapply Eminent Domain, WALL ST. J., 
July 23, 2001, at B1 (quoting David McEwan). 
 220. See generally Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935). 
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Thus, although pretextuality might have been an element in the city abet-
ting Costco’s wrongful scheme, it would not indicate that the city had an 
underlying wrongful purpose.  One could argue that pretextuality in Kelo 
was shorthand for “pretextuality for bad purpose.”  Akin to the Catholic 
theological concept of “double effect,”221 the premise would be that the 
government action in cases like 99 Cents Only Stores should be regarded as 
privileged because of the legitimacy of its dominant purpose. 
The broader point, however, is that courts rightly should be concerned 
when private actors have the opportunity to leverage eminent domain to the 
disadvantage of competitors and other possible victims of what might rise 
to legalized extortion.  In 99 Cents Only Stores, an exaction could be had 
from only the landowner whose property was taken.222  In Didden v. Vil-
lage of Port Chester, however, the redeveloper to whom eminent domain 
powers had been delegated could exact money from many landowners in 
exchange for condemning other parcels in the redevelopment district. 223 
3. The Manichean Distinction Between Public and Private Benefit 
Justice Stevens began his analysis in Kelo by stating that government 
may not condemn land belonging to A for the “sole purpose” of benefitting 
B,224 and that a “purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of 
the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of gov-
ernment and would thus be void.”225  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
declares that “transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored 
private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are 
forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”226 
Official acts that public officials perform to benefit themselves, their 
family, and those who bribe them are punishable by criminal law.227  State 
actions executing the scheme are arbitrary and capricious and hence run 
afoul of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
 
 221.  See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 130 (1972) 
(describing the “double effect” as a doctrine which distinguishes between bringing some-
thing about deliberately and bringing something about as a side effect of a deliberate act). 
 222. 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
 223. 173 F. App’x 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 224. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
 225. Id. (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)). 
 226. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469, 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 227. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984) (relating history of crime of bri-
bery). 
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ments.228  However, every public official knows that private firms enter in-
to the redevelopment process precisely because of the possibility of their 
private gain, and that post-contractual attempts to thwart such gain would 
give the city the reputation of an unreliable redevelopment partner.  In that 
sense, a government entity embarking on condemnation for retransfer for 
private redevelopment objectively must desire private gain. 
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Kelo suggests the Manichean distinction that 
gains could be purely public or private.  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
suggests that, while there could be both private and public gains, one would 
be incidental to the other.  Stevens’ assertion seems wrong in theory.  Ken-
nedy’s, alas, seems incapable of application. 
Citing the eminent Michigan jurist Thomas Cooley, the state’s supreme 
court rejected economic revitalization takings in County of Wayne v. Hath-
cock.229  That case overruled the court’s Poletown doctrine, which counte-
nanced the condemnation of an entire ethnic neighborhood for an auto as-
sembly plant.230 
Every business, every productive unit in society, does, as Justice Cooley 
noted, contribute in some way to the commonwealth.  To justify the exer-
cise of eminent domain solely on the basis of the fact that the use of that 
property by a private entity seeking its own profit might contribute to the 
economy’s health is to render impotent our constitutional limitations on 
the government’s power of eminent domain.  Poletown’s “economic ben-
efit” rationale would validate practically any exercise of the power of 
eminent domain on behalf of a private entity.  After all, if one’s owner-
ship of private property is forever subject to the government’s determina-
tion that another private party would put one’s land to better use, then the 
ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the expansion 
plans of any large discount retailer, “megastore,” or the like.231 
Justice Kennedy’s formulation that “transfers intended to confer benefits 
on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual 
 
 228. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584 (1972) (noting 
that “the protection of the individual against arbitrary action is the very essence of due 
process”) (ellipses, punctuation, and internal citations omitted). 
 229. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
 230. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
 231. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786.  Perhaps this paragraph was the inspiration for Jus-
tice O’Connor’s much more widely quoted lines: 
For who among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive 
possible use of her property?  The specter of condemnation hangs over all proper-
ty.  Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-
Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory. 
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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public benefits,”232 does not make clear whether the proscribed intent 
would have to encompass incidental public benefits.  Either way, “intent” 
regarding the future is as ephemeral as Penn Central’s “expectations” 
about the future. 
Justice Thomas noted that New London’s project, which stated a “vague 
promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue,” also was “suspiciously 
agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation.”233  But the Fort Trumbull redevelop-
ment undoubtedly contemplated future consequences of its decisions as 
well as present ones. 
The immediate function of the Fort Trumbull redevelopment was to 
build the infrastructure that would be synergetic with Pfizer’s adjoining re-
search center, so that the company would benefit from the restaurants, 
shops, hotels, and upscale housing that would provide amenities and lodg-
ing for its key personnel and visitors.  The redevelopment tenants, in turn, 
would benefit from the patronage of Pfizer and its employees and invi-
tees.234 
The second purpose of the redevelopment was to serve as a catalyst for 
the creation of jobs and needed economic activity in New London and 
Connecticut, partly through encouraging other corporations to relocate.  
For decisionmaking executives of these companies, the minutiae of Fort 
Trumbull negotiations and ensuing contract provisions were hardly rele-
vant.  They would be greatly interested in the basic economic terms the city 
and state would offer them, to be sure.  Beyond that, however, the bottom 
line question would be posed to their Pfizer counterparts at business round-
table and trade meetings: “Was New London agreeable to meeting your 
needs?”  Not only was complying with the informally expressed needs of 
Pfizer officials not inimical to the best interest of the city, it affirmatively 
furthered the economic development of the city.235 
Justice O’Connor’s explanation that “private benefit and incidental pub-
lic benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing,” and that 
“any boon for Pfizer or the plan’s developer is difficult to disaggregate 
from the promised public gains in taxes and jobs” is exactly on point.236 
 
 232. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 233. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 234. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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4. Practical Objections to Pretextuality 
Calder v. Bull described the pure government transfer of property from 
A to B as “against all reason and justice.”237  But where the benefits are 
“merged and mutually reinforcing,” the principle that government should 
not arbitrarily favor one citizen to the detriment of another has to do with 
an evaluation of ends and means. 
Calder presents a zero-sum game. B now has the property and A does 
not. While this sequence of events does not, ex post, affect third parties, it 
is clear, ex ante, that society would be a net loser.  Property owners like A 
would expend time and money attempting to thwart or buy off officials 
who might facilitate grabs of their property.  Correspondingly, predators 
like B would devote their talents and cash to bringing about such untoward 
results.  As is the case with outright theft, the costs are in both effectuating 
and preventing redevelopment transfers, and also, as Professor Frank Mi-
chelman described, in the demoralization of rightful owners that would dis-
courage productive investment.238 
However, “pretextual” takings involve not actions, but rather variance 
between articulated motives and actual motives.  Unlike Calder transfers, 
pretextual transfers may or may not involve losses to society.  They might 
well provide benefit to the city engaging in them.  Besides, demoralization 
costs are present in any exercise of eminent domain. 
Assume that Smith is mayor of a small city, and Jones is a developer 
who has contributed to Smith’s reelection campaigns.  Jones proposes that 
the city undertake a redevelopment project that will require condemnation 
and will benefit the city in the amount of $20X.  Assume that the benefit to 
Jones will be $10X.  On its face, there is no evidence to suggest that Jones 
would have offered a sweeter deal or that the city could have obtained more 
than $20X from anyone else.  Now, assume instead that, other facts remain-
ing the same, Jones derived $30X in benefit, which is more than the city 
did.  Further assume that, in the latter case, fear of charges of “pretextuali-
 
 237. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). 
 238. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
“Demoralization costs” are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to 
offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from 
the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dol-
lar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social 
unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, 
and other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be sub-
jected to similar treatment on some other occasion. 
Id. at 1214 (internal footnote omitted). 
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ty” led the city to accept a redevelopment project from Clark instead.  
Clark would derive $8X in value, and the city would derive $15X. 
Why should the city have to derive $5X less in value by dealing with 
Clark, simply to avoid Jones obtaining a greater return than the city?  This 
analysis suggests that the real problem with pretextuality is not that gov-
ernment is acting for bad motives, but rather that it is acting for opaque mo-
tives.  Perhaps its actions are for the best, and perhaps they are not.  We 
just do not know, and that does not seem fair.  As a prophylactic measure, 
we might want to ban government officials from taking part in non-
transparent transactions.239 
It might be, as in the case of offenses deemed “hate crimes,” that society 
decides to enhance the punishment accorded a wrongful act based on its 
motive.  The fear of victimization by a criminal motivated by racism, xe-
nophobia, or a similar motive imposes psychological and deterrence costs 
upon potential victims in excess of those imposed upon other potential vic-
tims of similar crimes.  Likewise, uncompensated losses arising from pre-
textual condemnation might engender a heightened sense of injury in the 
condemnee, who would ascribe his injury to predation rather than to the 
random chance of government necessity.  In the case of “pretextual” con-
demnation, where such an enhanced level of injury might justify as an ap-
propriate preventative, Justice Kennedy suggested a higher level of judicial 
scrutiny in appropriate types of situations.240 
C. Vitiating the Public Use Clause—Goldstein and Kaur 
In Marbury v. Madison,241 the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.”242  The Court more recently stated that ‘‘the question [of] what 
is a public use is a judicial one.’’243  To the extent the New York Court of 
Appeals unduly defers to the political branches of government, it not only 
makes it almost impossible for a landowner to win on public use grounds, it 
also deprives the Public Use Clause of any independent significance. 
 
 239. This was a reason offered by Professor Thomas Merrill as to why cities assemble 
parcels through eminent domain rather than adopt “private developers’ ‘guile.’” See Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82 (1986); see also infra 
notes 395-96 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
 240. See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
 241. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 242. Id. at 177. 
 243. Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930). 
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1. The Court of Appeals Regards “Public Use” as Redundant 
The lesson of Goldstein and Kaur is that the New York Court of Appeals 
will enforce the Public Use Clause only where it is unnecessary.  Through 
its vague and open ended definitions of crucial concepts such as “blight” 
and “civic purpose,” the court’s jurisprudence implicitly is founded on the 
notion that a governmental entity or its chosen redeveloper’s exercise of 
eminent domain will be held not to be for public use only under circums-
tances in which it would lose on independent grounds.  In other words, 
where other aspects of the taking comport with constitutional and statutory 
requirements, public use always would be found.  Conversely, where a tak-
ing is set aside on public use grounds, it could be set aside for another rea-
son. The result is that the Public Use Clause never is outcome determina-
tive. 
2. An Open-Ended View of “Blight” 
The alluring notion of “blight,”244 in its most expansive form, permeates 
both Goldstein and Kaur.  In Goldstein, Chief Judge Lipmann noted that 
the “removal of urban blight” is sanctioned in the court’s 1936 decision in 
New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 245 and in the State Constitu-
tion, for the alleviation of “substandard and insanitary areas.”246  He added, 
though, that by 1975, in Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Mor-
ris,247 urban renewal had progressed from the alleviation of “slums” to 
dealing with other “threats to the public sufficient to make their removal 
cognizable as a public purpose,” including “economic underdevelopment 
and stagnation.”248 
In his dissenting opinion in Goldstein, Judge Smith reviewed the court’s 
caselaw, including Muller and Morris, and concluded that while these cases 
undoubtedly expanded the old understanding of public use, they did not es-
tablish the general proposition that property may be condemned and turned 
over to a private developer every time a state agency thinks that doing so 
would improve the neighborhood.249  The majority provided a half-hearted 
defense: 
It may be that the bar has now been set too low—that what will now pass 
as ‘‘blight,’’ as that expression has come to be understood and used by 
 
 244. See infra Part IV.B. 
 245. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 171 (N.Y. 2009) (citing 
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936)). 
 246. Id. (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII § 1). 
 247. 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975). 
 248. Id. at 330. 
 249. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 187 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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political appointees to public corporations relying upon studies paid for 
by developers, should not be permitted to constitute a predicate for the in-
vasion of property rights and the razing of homes and businesses.  But any 
such limitation upon the sovereign power of eminent domain as it has 
come to be defined in the urban renewal context is a matter for the Legis-
lature, not the courts.250 
This admission is remarkable, first, for its passive construction, referring 
to the possibility that the standard was “set too low” and how the lack of 
constraint “has come to be defined.”  More importantly, it seemed to treat 
the “sovereign power of eminent domain” as the prerogative of the Legisla-
ture, as if the sovereign people had not in their constitution provided for the 
judicial department as well as the legislative department.251  The Court of 
Appeals’ perspective on blight seems to be a function of the Georgist view 
of property ownership and the State’s claims first enunciated by Chief 
Judge Breitel.252 
3. Pretext in Goldstein and Kaur 
The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Goldstein v. New York Urban Devel-
opment Corp. did not mention the issue of pretext at all,253 but it was raised 
in Judge Smith’s dissent: 
According to the petition in this case, when the project was originally an-
nounced in 2003 the public benefit claimed for it was economic develop-
ment—job creation and the bringing of a professional basketball team to 
Brooklyn.  Petitioners allege that nothing was said about “blight” by the 
sponsors of the project until 2005; ESDC has not identified any earlier use 
of the term.  In 2005, ESDC retained a consultant to conduct a “blight 
study.”  In light of the special status accorded to blight in the New York 
law of eminent domain, the inference that it was a pretext, not the true 
motive for this development, seems compelling.254 
The majority emphasized that the court was limited in its review to the 
record developed by the ESDC,”255 a principle well established in New 
York law.256  Given that the controlling record was made by the agency 
 
 250. Id. at 172. 
 251. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text. 
 252. See infra Parts IV.A.1-A.2 for further discussion. 
 253. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 254. Id. at 189 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 255. Id. at 166 (citing In re Levine v. New York State Liquor Auth., 245 N.E.2d 804 
(N.Y. 1969)). 
 256. In re Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 443 N.E.2d 940, 942 (N.Y. 
1982) (“A fundamental principle of administrative law long accepted by this court limits 
judicial review of an administrative determination solely to the grounds invoked by the 
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fostering urban renewal, however, and Judge Smith’s characterization that 
the agency’s determination was “self-serving,”257 it is important that it be 
considered in that light. 
Judge Smith noted that only the northern part of the Atlantic Yards 
project area could be described as “blighted,” and that the southern part, 
where the plaintiffs lived, appeared to be “a normal and pleasant residential 
community.”258  “Choosing their words carefully, the consultants con-
cluded that the area of the proposed Atlantic Yards development, taken as a 
whole, was ‘characterized by blighted conditions.’”259  He concluded: “It is 
clear to me from the record that the elimination of blight, in the sense of 
substandard and unsanitary conditions that present a danger to public safe-
ty, was never the bona fide purpose of the development at issue in this 
case.”260 
For its part, the majority stated facts in the record supporting this deter-
mination and noted that when administrative bodies “‘have made their find-
ing, not corruptly or irrationally or baselessly, there is nothing for the 
courts to do about it, unless every act and decision of other departments of 
government is subject to revision by the courts.’”261 
As noted earlier,262 in the aftermath of the New York Court of Appeals 
decision in Goldstein,263 the Appellate Division held in Kaur v. New York 
State Urban Development Corp. that condemnation by the Empire State 
Development Corporation for the purpose of extending the Columbia Uni-
versity campus in West Harlem violated the public use requirement.264  The 
Appellate Division described the blight designation in Kaur as “mere so-
phistry.”265  It stated that the designation “was utilized by ESDC years after 
the scheme (i.e., the Manhattanville Project) was hatched to justify the em-
ployment of eminent domain, but this project has always primarily con-
cerned a massive capital project for Columbia.  Indeed, it is nothing more 
 
agency, and if those grounds are insufficient or improper, the court is powerless to sanction 
the determination by substituting what it deems a more appropriate or proper basis.”). 
 257. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 186 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 258. Id. at 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 259. Id. at 190 (internal citation omitted). 
 260. Id. at 189. 
 261. Id. at 172 (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.Y.2d 659, 661 (1953)).  Judge 
Smith pointed out that Kaskel was a taxpayer’s suit, brought under a section of municipal 
law requiring corruption, fraud, or a total lack of agency power in order to succeed. Id. at 
188 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 262. See supra Part II.C. 
 263. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164. 
 264. 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 265. Id. at 10. 
EAGLE_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011  7:01 PM 
2011] PUBLIC USE IN THE DIRIGISTE TRADITION 1059 
than economic redevelopment wearing a different face.”266  The court 
noted that, in his concurring opinion in Kelo, Justice Kennedy “placed par-
ticular emphasis on the importance of the underlying planning process . . . 
and laid out in detail the elements of the New London plan that ensured 
against impermissible favoritism.”267 
The Appellate Division stated that the “contrast between ESDC’s 
scheme for the redevelopment of Manhattanville and New London’s plan 
for Fort Trumbull could not be more dramatic.”268  It enumerated elements 
by which the Manhattanville plan diverged from New London’s, including 
Master Plan findings that Manhattanville was experiencing a “renaissance 
of economic development” prior to the proposed project, that “Columbia 
underwrote all of the costs of studying and planning for what would be-
come a sovereign-sponsored campaign of Columbia’s expansion,” and that 
the redevelopment agency’s commitment to rezoning Manhattanville was 
“not for the goal of general economic development or to remediate an area 
that was ‘blighted’ before Columbia acquired over 50% of the property, but 
rather solely for the expansion of Columbia itself.”269 
The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that ESDC’s “findings of 
blight and determination that the condemnation of petitioners’ property 
qualified as a ‘land use improvement project’ were rationally based and en-
titled to deference.”270 
D. Meaningful Scrutiny and Procedural Roadblocks 
Promises in Kelo that instances of public use condemnation abuse “can 
be confronted if and when they arise,”271 and that “[a] court applying ra-
tional basis review . . . should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, 
is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pre-
textual public benefits,”272 are effective only if implemented.  As Justice 
Kennedy noted in his concurrence, “meaningful rational basis review” re-
quires that courts “conduct[] a careful and extensive inquiry” into primary 
and incidental benefits.273  Unfortunately, there is significant tension be-
 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 12-13 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491-93 (2005) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 268. Id. at 13. 
 269. Id. at 13-14. 
 270. Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010). 
 271. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487. 
 272. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 273. Id. at 491-92. 
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tween that goal and the insulation of legislative decisionmaking from over-
ly intrusive judicial review. 
1. Public Use and “Meaningful” Judicial Scrutiny 
While Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion as the necessary fifth 
vote in Kelo v. City of New London,274 his concurring opinion urged the 
adoption of “the meaningful rational basis review that in [his] view is re-
quired under the Public Use Clause.”275  He cited favorably to City of Cle-
burne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,276 a case in which group homes for 
the retarded were given less favorable zoning treatment than other multi-
family housing, such as hotels and fraternity houses.  While purporting to 
use rational basis review, the Court actually examined the proffered bases 
for the distinction, instead of asserting that the city must have had a plausi-
ble basis.277  The case is a leading example of “covert[] heightened scruti-
ny.”278 
Justice Kennedy accepted the premise that eminent domain should be 
upheld if “‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.’”279  Howev-
er, he suggested that this takings standard was parallel to, and not an appli-
cation of, similar standards developed by the Court in other contexts.280 
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause 
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a 
particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, 
just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection 
Clause must strike down a government classification that is clearly in-
tended to injure a particular class of private parties, with only incidental 
or pretextual public justifications.281 
The “clear showing” of favoritism and disproportional private benefit 
standard, as Justice Kennedy employed it, seems far less burdensome than 
a judicial refusal to find substantive due process applicable to deprivations 
 
 274. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 275. Id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 276. Id. at 491; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985). 
 277. Cleburne, 545 U.S. at 446-47, 450. 
 278. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1612 (2d ed. 1988); 
Eagle, Property Tests, supra note 215, at 951-54 (discussing the Cleburne line of cases). 
 279. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Mid-
kiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)). 
 280. Id. (“This deferential standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to review 
economic regulation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.”) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 281. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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of property at all,282 or application of a  “shocks the conscience” stan-
dard.283 
In order to give the condemnee a chance to make this “clear showing,” a 
“court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism 
to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review the 
record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the govern-
ment’s actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose.”284  
Where there is a “plausible accusation,” then, the first object of judicial in-
quiry is not to decide if the taking has some legitimate public purpose, but 
rather to see if the record indicates pretext or disproportional benefit. 
“The record,” for these purposes, should be defined in connection with 
Justice Kennedy’s next point. 
My agreement with the Court that a presumption of invalidity is not war-
ranted for economic development takings in general, or for the particular 
takings at issue in this case, does not foreclose the possibility that a more 
stringent standard of review than that announced in Berman and Midkiff 
might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings. 
There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermiss-
ible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebutta-
ble or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use 
Clause.285 
The category of takings comprised of transactions where the transferee 
(i) initiated the condemnation or was hand-selected by officials ordering 
the taking; (ii) would benefit substantially from the taking; and (iii) bene-
fited from a complex and perhaps opaque administrative process, presents 
precisely the possibility of “undetected impermissible favoritism” with 
which Justice Kennedy was concerned.286 
In such a situation, it is not unlikely that officials and their selected re-
developer work together to shape an administrative record that appears un-
blemished on its face.  A court reviewing this record would find ample ref-
erences to legitimate public purposes and no substantial evidence of 
favoritism, disproportionality, or pretext.  But, under these circumstances, 
that court would not be taking the condemnee’s accusation seriously.  That, 
in essence, marks the flaws in the New York Court of Appeals review of 
 
 282. See Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. City of Mountain Brook, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
 283. See Mongeau. v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2007); United Art-
ists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 284. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 285. Id. at 493 (emphasis added). 
 286. Id. 
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Goldstein and Kaur.  In this regard, as in other aspects of the Kelo case, 
Justice O’Connor’s reservations seem prescient: 
The Court protests that it does not sanction the bare transfer from A to B 
for B’s benefit.  It suggests two limitations on what can be taken after to-
day’s decision.  First, it maintains a role for courts in ferreting out takings 
whose sole purpose is to bestow a benefit on the private transferee–
without detailing how courts are to conduct that complicated inquiry.  For 
his part, Justice Kennedy suggests that courts may divine illicit purpose 
by a careful review of the record and the process by which a legislature 
arrived at the decision to take–without specifying what courts should look 
for in a case with different facts, how they will know if they have found it, 
and what to do if they do not.  Whatever the details of Justice Kennedy’s 
as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the “stupid 
staff[er]” failing it.287 
If the “Armstrong principle” of fairness288 is the leitmotif of the Takings 
Clause, it entails that individuals should not be singled out to bear burdens, 
and that the burdens imposed upon them should not be disproportional to 
either the burdens imposed on others similarly situated or the burdens that 
their actions impose on the community. 
Scholars and judges have long considered concepts of fairness and pro-
portionality in connection with takings liability.  A classic article by Pro-
fessor Robert Ellickson discussed the tendency of government to impose 
development exactions on landowners lacking political power.289  Similar-
ly, Professor Saul Levmore observed that takings claims are more compel-
ling when the condemnee was singled out as a target of opportunity.290 
Meaningful rational basis review, the “more stringent” standard that Jus-
tice Kennedy advocated for questionable categories of public use tak-
ings,291 requires that rational basis inquiry be conducted with regard to ac-
tually proffered justifications for government acts and not conjectural or 
plausible ones.  This was the standard used in the Cleburne case, to which 
 
 287. Id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1025-26 & n.12 (1992)) (additional citations omitted). 
 288. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). See also supra notes 192-96 and 
accompanying text. 
 289. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 
86 YALE L.J. 385, 439 (1977) (“Development charges . . . are widely used by small suburbs 
because they cream off the surplus of a particular group of landowners who have little polit-
ical power.”). 
 290. Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306-07 
(1990) (contrasting small, isolated property owners in special need of constitutional protec-
tion from large, institutional owners, that easily could become involved in the political 
process). 
 291. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Justice Kennedy referred, and in similar cases in which there was a possi-
bility of abuse.292 
A reminder that “public use” is contextual and not a permanent imprima-
tur of approval is contained in a case arising from a troubled New York re-
vitalization project, the Destiny USA Mall.293  In Kaufmann’s Carousel, 
Inc. v. City of Syracuse Industrial Development Agency,294 a retail store 
claimed that easements it owned could not be condemned as part of recon-
figuring rights in the project; those easements had been acquired as the re-
sult of an earlier condemnation for retransfer.295  Although Kaufmann’s 
claimed that the earlier condemnation in its favor certified its use as being a 
“public use” that could not subsequently be disturbed, it was unable to con-
vince the court.296 
In the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,297 one of the is-
sues before the Court was whether judicial actions could constitute regula-
tory takings.  The Court did not decide the “judicial takings” issue.  How-
ever, in a part of Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court joined by only Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, Scalia declared that “the 
Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying 
for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking.  To be sure, 
the manner of state action may matter . . . But the particular state actor is 
irrelevant.”298  In Dolan v. City of Tigard,299 the Court held that exactions 
of property required for development approvals had to be based on “indivi-
dualized determination” and “rough proportionality” to the burden of the 
locality that they imposed.300  But these requirements applied only to ad-
ministrative determinations, not to legislative exactions.301  To the extent 
that subsequent cases adopt Scalia’s view in Stop the Beach that what is 
 
 292. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (distribution of Alaska natural-
recourse income according to duration of residency is irrational); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982) (denial of public school to children of illegal immigrants is irrational); see also 
Eagle, Property Tests, supra note 215, at 952-54. 
 293. See, e.g., Rick Moriarty, Syracuse to Decide Deadline for Destiny USA Mall Addi-
tion, THE POST-STANDARD, Dec. 19, 2010, available at http://www.syracuse.com/news/ 
index.ssf/2010/12/syracuse_to_decade_deadline_fo.html. 
 294. 750 N.Y.S.2d 212, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
 295. Id. at 214. 
 296. Id. at 221. 
 297. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 298. Id. at 2602. 
 299. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 300. Id. at 391. 
 301. See Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (asserting that there is no relevant differ-
ence between administrative and legislative exactions). 
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important is that the State act, and not the State actor, the distinction drawn 
by Dolan becomes eroded. 
2. Pretext Defenses and Discovery 
In Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp. (Franco I),302 the 
District of Columbia’s redevelopment agency condemned Franco’s store in 
the Skyland Shopping Center in the southeast quadrant of the District.  The 
center contained about thirty stores, and a draft bill introduced in the Coun-
cil of the District of Columbia called for its condemnation as “necessary 
and desirable for the public use.”303  The bill “did not explain why the 
properties were ‘necessary’ or to what ‘public use’ they would be de-
voted.”304 There were no public hearings before the bill was passed, but the 
enacted version contained a set of findings of crime and blight, including 
underutilization, neglect, poor maintenance, and absentee ownership facili-
tating the accumulation of trash.305  “The Council also found that ‘[t]he as-
semblage of the properties comprising the Skyland Shopping Center and 
the construction of a new shopping center on the site . . . will further many 
important public purposes,’” including alleviation of the factors noted 
above.306 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals exercised jurisdiction be-
cause the trial court had granted the redevelopment agency immediate pos-
session, and had exercised pendant appellate jurisdiction because the issues 
in the dispute were “inextricably intertwined.”307 
Proceeding to the merits, the court first noted that Kelo reiterated the 
Supreme Court’s “‘longstanding policy of deference to legislative judg-
ments in this field.’”308  However, 
Kelo recognized that there may be situations where a court should not 
take at face value what the legislature has said.  The government will rare-
ly acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason, so a property own-
er must in some circumstances be allowed to allege and to demonstrate 
that the stated public purpose for the condemnation is pretextual.  It may 
be difficult to make this showing, and the Supreme Court’s decision may 
 
 302. 930 A.2d 160 (D.C. 2007). 
 303. Id. at 163. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 165. 
 308. Id. at 168 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005)). 
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raise many more questions than it answers, but a pretext defense is not 
necessarily “foreclosed by Kelo.”309 
The court observed that “Justice Kennedy focused hypothetically on the 
insubstantial quality of touted public benefits, stating “that transfers in-
tended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with 
only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public 
Use Clause.”310 
Franco I noted that it could not “indulge baseless, conclusory allegations 
that the legislature acted improperly,”311 but that it “could not summarily 
deny without a hearing a property owner’s detailed objections.”312  It held 
that “in this case the defense may not be rejected as a matter of pleading,” 
vacated the order granting the agency immediate possession, and re-
manded.313  On remand, the trial court granted broad discovery on Franco’s 
takings claim, but deprived him of his substantive pretext defense by apply-
ing collateral estoppel based on another Skyway Shopping Center condem-
nation case.314  The appellate court held, in Franco II, that collateral estop-
pel was inapplicable.315 
Franco II316 also rejected the District’s motion to dismiss the pretext 
claim, treating it as a claim for summary judgment, since it involved mat-
ters outside the pleadings.317  It observed that “[e]ssentially, Franco was 
seeking the same opportunity to complete discovery related to his pretext 
claim” that he had enjoyed in his condemnation case “on virtually the same 
question, i.e., his pretext defense,” and remanded.318 
3. The Role of Twombly and Iqbal 
Pretextuality is more difficult to plead as a result of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,319 and Ashcroft v. Iq-
 
 309. Id. at 169. 
 310. Id. at 173. 
 311. Id. at 171. 
 312. Id. (citing United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, More or Less, 478 F.2d 1055, 1057, 
1059 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
 313. Id. at 175-76. 
 314. Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp. (Franco II), 3 A.3d 300, 303 (D.C. 
2010). 
 315. Id. at 305.  In a related procedural issue, Franco II held that the landowner was not 
collaterally estopped from asserting his pretext defense because a similar defense had not 
prevailed in a separate lawsuit filed by another condemnee in the same revitalization project 
in which Franco had not participated. Id. 
 316. Id. at 300. 
 317. Id. at 307. 
 318. Id. at 308. 
 319. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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bal.320  In 1957, in Conley v. Gibson,321 the Supreme Court enunciated “the 
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”322  As ex-
plained in Iqbal, the Court adopted a stricter standard in Twombly, requir-
ing that: 
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient fac-
tual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.”  A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the de-
fendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.  The plausibility standard is 
not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.  Where a complaint 
pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it 
“stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement 
to relief.’”323 
Franco I stated that the Twombly standard had been met.324  However, 
Twombly played a substantial, if not fully specified, role in Goldstein v. Pa-
taki.325  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to ex-
plore the parameters of the case, since the appellants accepted its applica-
bility and “[a]s all parties acknowledge, at a bare minimum, the operative 
standard requires the plaintiff [to] provide the grounds upon which his 
claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level.’”326  The Second Circuit concluded that, “[i]n 
view of what they have effectively conceded in prosecuting this lawsuit, 
the appellants cannot meet this standard.”327 
Goldstein v. Pataki considered whether the plaintiffs’ Atlantic Yards 
claim sufficiently alleged that the taking of his property by eminent domain 
violated the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The court stated 
that they had effectively acknowledged the project’s public benefits, but 
contended that these “serv[ed] as a ‘pretext’ that masks its actual raison 
d’être: enriching the private individual who proposed it and stood to profit 
 
 320. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 321. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 322. Id. at 45-46. 
 323. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citations omitted) (quoting Twom-
bly, 550 U.S. at 556-70). 
 324. Franco I, 930 A.2d at 170 (noting that “Franco made many specific factual allega-
tions to support this claim”). 
 325. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 326. Id. at 56 (quoting ATSI Commc’ns v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545)). 
 327. Id. at 56-57. 
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most from its completion.”328  It noted as the essence of the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument: 
Defendants’ decision to take Plaintiffs’ properties serves only one pur-
pose: it allows Ratner to build a Project of unprecedented size, and thus 
reap a profit that Defendants, tellingly, have attempted to conceal at every 
turn.  This is not merely favoritism of a particular developer. . . . Here, the 
‘‘favored’’ developer is driving and dictating the process, with govern-
ment officials at all levels obediently falling into line.329 
These claims, the Second Circuit continued, related to the fact that Bruce 
Ratner was the impetus behind the Project, that his proffered civic im-
provements were post hoc justifications, and that the Empire State Devel-
opment Corporation’s review was a “sham” in which the outcome was long 
“predetermined.”330  The court explained that the gravamen of the plain-
tiffs’ contentions is that benefits objectively related to public use “should 
nevertheless be rejected as ‘pretextual,’ not because they are false, but be-
cause they are not the real reason for the Project’s approval.”331 
The court stated that pre-Kelo instances in which federal courts ad-
dressed pretextuality “contested whether any public use would be served by 
the taking.”332 
In contrast, the particular kind of ‘‘pretext’’ claim the plaintiffs in this 
case advance bears an especially dubious jurisprudential pedigree: The 
plaintiffs have effectively acknowledged the Project’s rational relation-
ship to numerous well-established public uses, but contend that it is con-
stitutionally impermissible nonetheless because one or more of the gov-
ernment officials who approved it was actually—and improperly—
motivated by a desire to confer a private benefit on Mr. Ratner. . . . [Plain-
tiffs] seek depositions of pertinent government officials, along with their 
emails, confidential communications, and other pre-decisional documents. 
They also dispute various plausible assumptions underlying the Project’s 
budget. 
 Allowing such a claim to go forward, founded only on mere suspicion, 
would add an unprecedented level of intrusion into the process. . . . 
 Accordingly, we must reject the notion that, in a single sentence, the 
Kelo majority sought sub silentio to overrule Berman, Midkiff, and over a 
 
 328. Id. at 52-53. 
 329. Id. at 55. 
 330. Id. at 56. 
 331. Id. at 58-59. 
 332. Id. at 62 & n.9 (citing Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1175 (E.D. Mo. 
2003); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2001)). 
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century of precedent and to require federal courts in all cases to give close 
scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking rationally related to a classic public 
use as a means to gauge the purity of the motives of the various govern-
ment officials who approved it.333 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii in County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe 
Family Partnership took another approach.334  The court asserted that the 
presence of even a “classic” public use would not obviate the possibility 
that the “actual purpose” was to confer private benefit, and thus the court 
permitted a pretextuality defense.335  On the other hand, it agreed with the 
Second Circuit in Goldstein v. Pataki336 that the appellants there were seek-
ing “an unprecedented level of intrusion into the process.”337  It then noted 
that the C & J Coupe plaintiff did not seek such intrusive review, but rather 
“as contemplated by Goldstein, questions ‘the basic legitimacy of the out-
come’ and seeks a ‘closer objective scrutiny of the justification being of-
fered.’”338 
Other cases have also indicated that the lower courts have yet to come to 
grips with the tension between the heightened scrutiny implied in Justice 
Stevens’339 and Kennedy’s340 Kelo opinions and the deferential rational ba-
sis approach the Court otherwise uses in land use and takings cases.341  
These include Carole Media L.L.C. v. New Jersey Transit Co.,342 where the 
Third Circuit disregarded evidence inconsistent with the Midkiff “rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose” standard,343 and Rhode Island 
Economic Development Corp. v. Parking Co.,344 where the court upheld a 
claim of pretextuality in a case where the State Department of Transporta-
tion would gain from termination of its contractual obligation.345 None of 
the cases considered in this discussion contained any clear indication of 
whether the court was applying a rational basis or heightened scrutiny stan-
dard, or clear guidance on how trial courts were to proceed on remand or in 
future cases. 
 
 333. Id. at 62 (citations omitted). 
 334. 198 P.3d 615 (Haw. 2008). 
 335. Id. at 648. 
 336. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 337. C & J Coupe Family P’ship, 198 P.3d at 649 (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63-64). 
 338. Id. (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63-64). 
 339. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 340. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 341. Id. at 480 (noting the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference”). 
 342. 550 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 343. Id. at 309 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)). 
 344. 892 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006). 
 345. Id. at 106-08. 
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“Neither the courts ruling against pretext claims, nor the courts ruling in 
favor of such claims, have any consistent, thorough, and rigorous doctrine 
governing their adjudication and the scrutiny to be applied.”346  The Su-
preme Court’s failure to grant certiorari in Kaur v. New York State Urban 
Development Corp.347 represents a lost opportunity to provide such clarity. 
In the end, the result of analyses such as that of the Second Circuit 
would preclude almost all public use pretextuality claims from receiving 
meaningful scrutiny. Plaintiffs would be required to submit pleadings 
showing with specificity evidence of no public use, or else a “smoking 
gun” demonstrating pretextual motivation.  Any large revitalization project, 
however, would produce at least some public benefit.  Even in the case of a 
small project, it would not be clear that pretextual explanation equates to 
invidious pretextual intent.348  A “smoking gun” would make fine evidence, 
but developers and officials collaborating on a project of substantial scope 
likely would be sufficiently seasoned and discrete to make this possibility 
highly unlikely.349  The outcome would vindicate Justice O’Connor’s sense 
of cynicism, or resignation, that “[w]hatever the details of Justice Kenne-
dy’s as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the ‘stupid 
staff[er]’ failing it.”350 
IV.  GOLDSTEIN, KAUR, AND PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS 
The previous section of this Article described how, in its application of 
Kelo v. City of New London351 in Goldstein v. New York State Urban De-
velopment Corp.,352 and Kaur v. New York State Urban Development 
Corp.,353 the New York Court of Appeals abrogated its duty to meaningful-
ly examine possible instances of eminent domain not for public use.  This 
Part concludes that this turn in law also is a blunder in public policy.  The 
very opacity inherent in public-private partnerships and redeveloper selec-
tion that contributes to making eminent domain legally objectionable in this 
context also makes it bad public policy. 
 
 346. Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tuck-
It-Away v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. at 21, 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010) (No. 10-402). 
 347. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 348. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text for discussion. 
 349. See infra notes 416-17 and accompanying text for discussion. 
 350. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 & n.12 (1992)). 
 351. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 352. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 353. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
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A. Penn Central, Henry George, and Agglomeration Economics 
1. Penn Central in the Court of Appeals: A Georgist Turn 
The New York Court of Appeals judgment in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York, favoring the New York City Landmarks Pre-
servation Commission, and against the construction of an office building on 
top of Grand Central Terminal, was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.354  
The Supreme Court’s Penn Central opinion has been subject to much criti-
cism, largely because its ad hoc multifactor analysis gives little real guid-
ance to lawyers and judges.355 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court indeed has been reticent in accepting 
or deciding cases that would allow it to refine its takings and public use 
doctrine,356 it did criticize Chief Judge Breitel’s New York Court of Ap-
peals’ Penn Central opinion.  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil,357 it took the New York court to task for its “extreme—and, we think, 
unsupportable—view of the relevant calculus” pertaining to the denomina-
tor of the takings fraction.358  The Court of Appeals, Lucas continued, had 
impermissibly “examined the diminution in a particular parcel’s value pro-
duced by a municipal ordinance in light of total value of the takings clai-
 
 354. 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 355. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retros-
pective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 679 (2005). 
Penn Central lacks doctrinal clarity because of its outright refusal to formulate the 
elements of a regulatory taking cause of action, and because of its intellectual 
romp through the law of eminent domain that paid scant attention to preexisting 
legal doctrine.  Its aftermath has become an economic paradise for specialized 
lawyers, a burden on the judiciary, as well as an indirect impediment to would-be 
home builders, and an economic disaster for would-be home buyers and for socie-
ty at large. 
Id. at 681. 
 356. See, e.g., Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
357 (2010) (denying review after four justices urged, in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and 
Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005), that the Court review requirement for state litigation to 
ripen takings claim against municipalities); Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 
(8th Cir. 2003) (incongruity of allowing only regulatory takings defendant to remove case to 
federal court, where Eighth Circuit strongly hinted Supreme Court should grant review); 
PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991) (uncontroverted claims of 
government destruction of development applicant’s submissions, case dismissed after oral 
argument). 
 357. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 358. Id. at 1016 n.7 (discussing Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1276-77, aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978)). 
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mant’s other holdings in the vicinity.”359  But that is only the tip of the ice-
berg. 
Chief Judge Breitel, writing for the Court of Appeals, noted the prin-
ciple, “rooted in the due process clause of the Constitution,” that the State 
“may not, by regulation, deprive a property owner of all reasonable return 
on his property.”360  He continued, however, by questioning 
the extent to which government, when regulating private property, must 
assure what is described as a reasonable return on that ingredient of prop-
erty value created not so much by the efforts of the property owner, but 
instead by the accumulated indirect social and direct governmental in-
vestment in the physical property, its functions, and its surroundings.361 
In his discussion of what gives property value, Chief Judge Breitel con-
tinued: 
So many of these attributes are not the result of private effort or invest-
ment but of opportunities for the utilization or exploitation which an or-
ganized society offers to any private enterprise, especially to a public util-
ity, favored by government and the public.  These, too, constitute a 
background of massive social and governmental investment in the orga-
nized community without which the private enterprise could neither exist 
nor prosper . . . .  It is that privately created and privately managed ingre-
dient which is the property on which the reasonable return is to be based.  
All else is society’s contribution by the sweat of its brow and the expendi-
ture of its funds.  To that extent society is also entitled to its due.362 
Phrases such as “indirect social and direct governmental investment” are 
breathtaking in their arrogation of all of the value inhering in a parcel not 
demonstrably attributable to activities of its owner to the State.  Under this 
reasoning, as Professor William Fischel noted, government was “entitled to 
appropriate to itself all of the advantages of civilization.”363  It is somewhat 
remarkable to see, at this late date, the chief judge of New York adopting 
such a Hobbesian view of the relationship of the individual and the State. 
Whereas John Locke asserted that individuals enter into a social contract 
whereby they institute government to protect their rights,364 Thomas 
Hobbes saw anarchy as such a threat to human flourishing, and life itself, 
 
 359. Id. 
 360. Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1272. 
 361. Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added). 
 362. Id. at 1273. 
 363. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 50 
(1995). 
 364. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERA-
TION §§ 124-26 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690). 
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that he was willing to grant absolute power to the sovereign.365  “By the 
late eighteenth century, ‘Lockean’ ideas on government and revolution 
were accepted everywhere in America; they seemed, in fact, a statement of 
principles built into English constitutional tradition.”366  Even critics of the 
Lockean view have concluded that property rights were the “great focus” of 
the Framers,367 and Hobbes’ views correspondingly were disfavored.368  In 
a recent regulatory takings case, Justice Kennedy made a cryptic but un-
mistakable reference to our constitutional tradition of accepting Locke and 
rejecting Hobbes.  In rejecting the assertion that the State could eliminate 
Takings Clause rights of new owners through the simple expedient of 
promulgating contrary regulations prior to their purchase, he declared: 
“The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bun-
dle.”369 
The Hobbesian turn of Chief Judge Breitel was abetted by vagueness 
and a lack of analysis.  He stated “the massive and indistinguishable public, 
governmental, and private contributions to a landmark like the Grand Cen-
tral Terminal are inseparably joint.”370  This led Professor Gideon Kanner 
to ask: “Just how one would go about distinguishing the indistinguishable, 
and separating the inseparable, the court never took the trouble to ex-
plain.”371 
2. Penn Central as Precursor to Agglomeration 
Chief Judge Breitel’s insight about societal value in Penn Central was 
not altogether wrong.  More accurately, it reflects that, mutatis mutandis, 
every owner of property derives value from the activity of his or her neigh-
bors and contributes to the value of their respective parcels in return.  A 
given property owner, therefore is not deriving a windfall, but rather is en-
 
 365. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 70 (Richard Flathman & David Johnston eds., W. W. 
Norton & Company, Inc. 1997) (1651). 
 366. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE 87 (1997). 
 367. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 92 (1990) (“The great focus of 
the Framers was the security of basic rights, property in particular, not the implementation 
of political liberty.”). 
 368. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 27-29, 55-59 (1967). 
 369. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001). 
 370. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (N.Y. 1977), 
aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 371. Kanner, supra note 355, at 686. 
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meshed in a relationship that Justice Holmes described as “reciprocity of 
advantage.”372 
New York City’s Midtown business district is vibrant because people 
gather there, which might be attributed to suburban railroad commuters de-
siring to work near Grand Central Terminal and a myriad of other reasons, 
comprising “indirect social investment.”  As Professor Robert Lucas put it: 
“What can people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if 
not for being near other people?”373  While there is no clear owner of the 
value generated by such a vibrant web of associations, it seems clear that 
those contributing to that wealth would have a strong aversion to its appro-
priation by outsiders.  Professor James Buchanan illustrated this principle 
in pointing out that wealthy and distinguished individuals had a marked 
preference for joining those private clubs that were owned by the members, 
rather than by proprietors, since proprietors could sooner or later charge 
each member for enjoying the value of association generated by all of the 
other members.374 
This kind of arrogation of relationships generating value is not limited to 
private social club owners or the New York Court of Appeals.  In Brown v. 
Legal Foundation of Washington,375 for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court 
countenanced the commandeering of the principal of law clients’ trust 
funds into Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) accounts, with the 
interest generated by those accounts directed for use by legal services pro-
grams.376  Brown’s justification, that their lawyers were not entitled to the 
money and that the program was limited to funds where it was not practical 
to create separate bank accounts for the individual clients, means that the 
State is the residual claimant of all value not nailed down in law, even 
when those with plausible interests in it work together and undoubtedly 
would prefer that the earnings stay within their partnership.377 
 
 372. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 373. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 3, 39 (1988). 
 374. James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965). 
 375. 538 U.S. 216 (2003). 
 376. Id. at 237-38. 
 377. For elaboration, see Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings, Public Use, and Just 
Compensation After Brown, 33 ENVTL L. REP. 10807, 10812 (2003) (noting that “neither a 
host nor her guest might be able to prove which is the rightful owner of coins found under 
the sofa cushion, each would have a better claim to the money than a visiting government 
inspector of upholstered furniture”). 
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3. Agglomeration and Public Policy 
In the decades since Penn Central, land and housing economists have 
come to analyze the synergies that come from the propinquity of people 
who could learn from or do business with each other as “agglomeration ef-
fects.”  The sub-discipline studying why people decide to locate in cities is 
referred to as “the New Economic Geography” or “agglomeration econom-
ics.”378  A major problem with the dirigiste approach to land use that marks 
grand projects such as CityCenter (Las Vegas), and Atlantic Yards (Brook-
lyn), is that it fails to take into account why people and businesses move to, 
within, and from cities. 
The traditional Tieboutian model assumes that individuals chose from 
competing suburbs or cities to find the mix of amenities provided by gov-
ernment and taxes imposed by government that suits them best.379  While 
Chief Judge Breitel was willing to credit “indirect social and direct go-
vernmental investment” to the State without examining it further,380 “ag-
glomeration economics”381 “starts with the basic claim that individuals and 
businesses make their location decisions on the basis of where other indi-
viduals and businesses decide to locate.”382  In other words, Breitel focused 
on gathering places, and agglomeration economics focuses on gathering 
people. 
Countering the attraction to the center resulting from agglomeration is 
the repulsion from the center that results from effects of high density, such 
as crowding of roads, higher rents, and lack of green space.  These reduc-
tions in amenities are collectively referred to as “congestion.”383  Some-
what akin is the increase in social bads, such as organized crime, that have 
increasing returns to scale.  As Professor David Schleicher suggests, these 
might better be termed “negative agglomerations.”384 
 
 378. See generally David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1507.  Schleicher cites foundational work, including Edward L. Glaeser, Are 
Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139 (1998) [hereinafter Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?]; Paul 
M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002 (1986); Lucas, 
supra note 373. 
 379. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418 (1956). 
 380. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1272-73 (N.Y. 
1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 381. Among other important contributions are EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOME-
RATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM (2008); MASAHISA FUJITA, PAUL KRUGMAN, AND AN-
THONY J. VENABLES, THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(1999); and Schleicher, supra note 378. 
 382. Schleicher, supra note 378, at 1509-10. 
 383. See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 378, at 150. 
 384. Schleicher, supra note 378, at 1529. 
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It is worth noting that the New York Court of Appeals’ approval of a 
“civic project” basis for upholding the expansion of the Columbia Univer-
sity campus into Manhattanville in Kaur was based largely on its agglo-
merative effect.385  Of course, although Columbia might deem its purposes 
loftier, the agglomerative effect of its activities differs little from those of, 
say, Manhattan’s garment district.386  Notably, however, regulations de-
signed to protect urban manufacturing areas have proved disadvanta-
geous.387 
B. Urban “Blight” as a Metaphor for Contagious Illness 
The word “blight” has greatly encouraged and justified condemnation 
for revitalization.  As described in Professor Wendell Pritchett’s path 
breaking article, “blight” is equated to a “public menace.”388  “By elevating 
blight into a disease that would destroy the city, renewal advocates broa-
dened the application of the Public Use Clause and at the same time 
brought about a re-conceptualization of property rights.”389  The U.S. Su-
preme Court accepted this model whole, stating in Berman v. Parker390 that 
“[t]he experts concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if it 
were not to revert again to a blighted or slum area, as though possessed of a 
congenital disease, the area must be planned as a whole.”391  Thus, in Ber-
man, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,392 and Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don,393 the Court has espoused that the remedy for blight is condemnation 
and government-directed redevelopment. 
 
 385. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 734 (N.Y. 2010), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
The indisputably public purpose of education is particularly vital for New York 
City and the State to maintain their respective statuses as global centers of higher 
education and academic research.  To that end, the Project plan includes the con-
struction of facilities dedicated to research and the expansion of laboratories, li-
braries and student housing. 
Id. 
 386. See Lucas, supra note 373, at 38 (“New York City’s garment district, financial dis-
trict, diamond district, advertising district and many more are as much intellectual centers as 
is Columbia or New York University.  The specific ideas exchanged in these centers differ, 
of course, from those exchanged in academic circles, but the process is much the same.”). 
 387. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative 
Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2010). 
 388. Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Pri-
vate Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003). 
 389. Id. at 3. 
 390. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 391. Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
 392. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 393. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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But, as I have elaborated upon elsewhere, abatement is the direct and 
proper remedy for blight, not condemnation.394  If the present owners, 
lenders, or parties with a potential interest are unwilling or unable to abate 
a nuisance, government may do so, impress a betterment lien upon the land, 
and foreclose the lien if and when unpaid.395  Encouraging local private in-
itiative and transparency, both important in a well-functioning republic, au-
gur strongly for this approach because the foreclosure process is both pub-
lic and modest in scale, as opposed to larger redevelopment projects whose 
developers are opaquely selected. 
C. Underutilization 
Much of the underpinning of the concept of “underutilization” of proper-
ty as blight is based upon Professor Michael Heller’s thesis of the anti-
commons.396  But, this is the tail wagging the dog.  The numerous shards of 
property noted by Heller that prevented the utilization of storefronts in 
Moscow were not endogenous to a natural evolution of private property 
rights, but rather were fragments resulting from the sudden implosion of 
the Soviet Union.397  The real story is that for three-quarters of a century 
Russia was governed by a regime that concomitantly repressed both indi-
vidual property and individual liberty.  Overly centralized control of re-
sources deprives individuals of their incentives and ability to apply their 
local and tacit knowledge to coordinate resource use.398  Furthermore, as 
Heller hints at, rent control and kindred regulations imposed in the name of 
(contested) non-utilitarian values also may lead to underutilization.399 
Because of concern about ostensible blight, the courts have counte-
nanced the use of eminent domain to acquire small parcels, with the result-
ing superparcel having a higher aggregate market value.  It might, or might 
not, have a higher aggregate social value, since condemnation results in the 
destruction of large (albeit almost immeasurable) amounts of subjective 
value, as well as the imposition of high out of pocket costs.400 
 
 394. Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Justify Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833 (2007). 
 395. Id. at 838. 
 396. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (1998). 
 397. See Steven J. Eagle, The Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND. L. 
REV. 1229, 1250-51 (2010) [hereinafter Eagle, Really New Property]. 
 398. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On 
Taking Our Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345 (2006) (claiming that the United States evan-
gelizes the free market, transparency, and subsidiarity in countries including those in the 
former Soviet Union, but is reluctant to adhere to these principles itself). 
 399. See Heller, supra note 396, at 671 n.228. 
 400. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. 
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As Professor Jonathan Barnett notes, however, market actors whose 
roles vary from one transaction to another have strong incentives to “resist 
and correct overpropertization.”401  In the urban renewal situation, howev-
er, actors do not switch roles.  Members of minority groups, persons of 
moderate income, and owners of small businesses are the condemnees.  
Well-connected redevelopers are post-condemnation transferees, and they 
proxy for the upscale businesses and residents that subsequently occupy 
their developments.  All of these groups have every reason to militate for 
more redevelopment. 
In New York, the Court of Appeals decisions in Goldstein and Kaur 
seem apiece with Chief Judge Breitel’s Georgist views in Penn Central.402 
Breitel saw much of the value of property resulting not from efforts of the 
landowner, but rather from “a background of massive social and govern-
mental investment in the organized community without which the private 
enterprise could neither exist nor prosper.”403  Therefore, the government, 
and not the landowner, is entitled to this value upon the exercise of eminent 
domain. 
A corollary of this view is that an owner who does not utilize his land 
productively is depriving society (i.e., the State) of some value that belongs 
to it.  A more sophisticated form of this argument is that the errant owner is 
depriving his neighbors (and society) of a duty owed under some sort of re-
ciprocity of advantage theory.404  One also might analogize the obligation 
to the right to provide lateral support to a neighbor’s land or to create con-
ditions that prevent neighbors from enjoying the enhanced value that would 
inure to them if those whose lands were contiguous were more industrious.  
The State, being the representative of society, can require good uses of land 
as well as prohibit bad.  There is no such “affirmative police power,” how-
ever. 
The Court of Appeals’ view also is reminiscent of that of A. C. Pigou, 
who recognized that it was necessary for society to rectify social harms that 
emanated from some parcels or activities, to the detriment of others.405  
Ronald Coase subsequently explained that negative externalities are typi-
cally not unilateral, but that activities impinge upon one another not be-
cause one is good and the other bad, but because both activities are legiti-
 
 401. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innova-
tion Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 390 (2009). 
 402. See supra Part IV.A. 
 403. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (N.Y. 1977), 
aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 404. See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
 405. See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160-68 (1920). 
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mate, but mutually incompatible.406  While the court’s implicit assumption 
seems to be that owners targeted for redevelopment who refuse to sell do so 
because they are “holdouts,” the alternative possibility is that “underutiliza-
tion” in the eyes of redevelopment agencies represents good utilization 
from the perspective of the owners.  In some highly publicized cases of 
eminent domain, the owners’ views might be a better economic choice as 
well.407 
D. The Information Problem and Information Paradox 
1. Government Disclosure is Cheap and Private Information is 
Expensive 
A major problem with eminent domain for private economic redevelop-
ment is asymmetry of information.  In his classic article The Economics of 
Public Use,408 Professor Thomas Merrill notes the broadest objection to the 
use of eminent domain for parcel assembly, that private developers regular-
ly assemble sites for shopping centers and commercial office developments 
without eminent domain.409  Merrill’s response is that this might work well 
for smaller parcels not strictly site-dependent, and, where anticipated, large 
gains could buy off rent seekers.410  More fundamentally, however, while 
conceding that straw transactions, options, and similar devices may work 
well for private developers, Merrill asserted that their utility for govern-
ment assembly is limited.  “The necessary ingredient of these techniques is 
secrecy, and governments, at least in an open society like the United States, 
are not very good at keeping secrets.”411  Even if it could keep information 
private, the possibilities of government purchasing agents buying off hol-
douts in secret deals and possibly tipping off potential sellers creates a 
“specter of corruption” that might make it prudent for eminent domain to 
be used instead of private developers’ “guile.”412 
 
 406. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 407. The saga of Susette Kelo is instructive in this regard. See supra Part III.A. 
 408. Merrill, supra note 239. 
 409. Id. at 81; see, e.g., Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
[T]he landscape of our country is flecked with shopping centers, office parks, 
clusters of hotels, and centers of entertainment and commerce.  We do not believe, 
and plaintiff does not contend, that these constellations required the exercise of 
eminent domain or any other form of collective public action for their formation. 
Id. at 783-84. 
 410. Merrill, supra note 239. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. 
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Another way to look at the fact that government typically must devise its 
plans for acquisitions in public view is that obtaining such disclosed infor-
mation is cheap.  Sellers and competing buyers need merely read the local 
newspapers or attend city council meetings to find out government’s land 
acquisition plans. 
But how does government decide whether and where to institute large 
urban revitalization projects in the first place?  Here it is vital that it ferret 
out the information that would lead it to the best decision.  But, as Profes-
sor Kenneth Arrow noted, information “is an economic good, in the sense 
that it is costly and valuable.”413  It is difficult to sell information, however, 
since the very process of informing a potential buyer of the reasons why it 
is valuable serves to convey the information for free.  Also, “there is no 
general way of defining units for information,” and information is difficult 
to evaluate.414 Yet, information about development opportunities can be 
quite lucrative, since one characteristic of information is an “extreme form 
of increasing returns.”415  The same bit of information that might be the key 
to a small project with modest profits might serve the same function for a 
large project with substantial profits. 
From the city’s perspective, it is difficult to evaluate the consequences of 
accepting a redevelopment proposal.  Furthermore, a little-known develop-
er might not have good judgment or prove a reliable partner.  Judgment and 
reliability, in this context, include avoiding potential embarrassment for lo-
cal officials, and, perhaps, providing reciprocal value for contracts 
awarded.  Sponsorship by a well-regarded team player provides the neces-
sary reputational bonding.  That is why newcomers may be told, “[w]e 
don’t want nobody that nobody sent.”416  Redevelopers that somebody sent 
would likely have to justify that patronage in ways that are both circuitous 
and difficult to substantiate.417 That one hand washes the other is the truism 
of crony capitalism. 
 
 413. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Information: An Exposition, 23 EMPIRICA 119-
28 (1996). 
 414. Id. at 120. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Interview by Harry Kreisler, Conversations with History, Inst. of Int’l Studs., U.C. 
Berkley, with Abner Jay Mikva, former Congressman (Apr. 12, 1999), available at 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Mikva/mikva-con2.html.  Mikva, later a member of 
Congress, a United States Court of Appeals judge, and counsel to President William J. Clin-
ton, related that a “quintessential Chicago Ward committeeman” turned him away with the 
those words when he arrived, unsponsored, to volunteer for Adlai Stevenson and Paul 
Douglas. Id. 
 417. An aphorism attributed to Senator Earl Long states: “Don’t write anything you can 
phone.  Don’t phone anything you can talk.  Don’t talk anything you can whisper.  Don’t 
whisper anything you can smile.  Don’t smile anything you can nod.  Don’t nod anything 
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2. Crony Capitalism and Urban Revitalization 
Government coordination of economic activity means that some actors 
are encouraged in certain undertakings.  These are of value, in turn, be-
cause they are forbidden to others.  The beneficiaries of such largess have 
acquired “regulatory property,”418 which has been placed in a limited num-
ber of hands and is susceptible to removal or dilution by the State. Accord-
ing to Professor John Coffee, however, the presence of dispersed owner-
ship is important for the autonomy of both government and providers of 
capital. 
This is the dark side of concentrated ownership; put simply, the separation 
of cash-flow rights from voting rights can serve as a means by which 
those controlling the public sector can extend their control over the pri-
vate sector.  At a minimum, the prospect of crony capitalism—that is, 
closely interlocked political and economic leaderships, each reciprocally 
assisting the other—ensures that concentrated owners will need to become 
deeply involved in government in order to protect their positions from ex-
isting rivals, new entrants, and political sycophants.419 
As Professor Coffee adds, “[o]nce concentrated ownership degenerates 
into a ‘crony capitalism’ that unites political and economic power, the role 
of law is likely to become minimal.”420  Professor Timothy Canova de-
scribed “crony capitalism” as the “tendency of ostensible public-sector reg-
ulatory authorities reaching out to help their ‘friends’ in the private sec-
tor.”421 
Much of the concern about crony capitalism results from concern about 
the causes and effects of bailouts of firms by government in time of eco-
nomic turmoil.  For instance, the Financial Times outlined that the rescue 
in the late 1990s of Long-Term Capital Management by the Federal Re-
serve took place in the context of a web of former colleagueship and per-
 
you can wink.” Earl Long Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/ 
quotes/e/earllong212427.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 418. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: 
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 
129 (2001) (coining term and explicating concept). 
 419. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the 
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 72 (2001). 
 420. Id. at 81. 
 421. Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoli-
beral Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1583 (1999) (reporting on American crony 
capitalism, conflicts of interest, and lack of transparency). 
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sonal friendship between top officials at the Fed and the beneficiaries of its 
largess.422 
The creation of massive urban redevelopment projects located on sites 
taken involuntarily from their previous owners and retransferred to power-
ful and sometimes politically well-connected new proprietors is fertile 
grounds for crony capitalism abuse.  Such accusations played an important 
role in opposition to New York’s Atlantic Yards project.  As suggested ear-
lier, one might conclude that the relationship between a leading bank and 
New York State government regarding the World Trade Center, instan-
tiated in the brothers Rockefeller, was not wholly arms-length.423  The 
same might be said for the provenance of New York Times coverage of 
Bruce Ratner and Atlantic Yards.424 
Another example is the recent account describing the allocation of funds 
from Chicago’s Tax Increment Financing (TIF) program, which is financed 
and administered outside the city’s annual budget.  “About $500 million 
has gone into the TIF program in each of the last four years, and most fi-
nancing decisions are made behind closed doors by top city officials and 
aldermen.”425 
E. Government, Property, and Coordination 
Condemnation for economic revitalization is, at its heart, a tool designed 
to bring economic resources to bear in repairing communities.426  The con-
ceit is that the “visible hand” of government, within the context of the regu-
latory state, can best coordinate activities.427  It is true, as Professors Robert 
Ahdieh,428 Michael Heller,429 and others argue, that “[t]he operative chal-
lenge is to coordinate property-rights holders around an efficient equili-
 
 422. See John Plender, Western Crony Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at 10 (criti-
cizing incestuous relationships between government and regulatory officials and investment 
bankers). 
 423. See supra notes 53-55. 
 424. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 425. Mick Dumke, Candidates Question the Ways Tax Increment Financing Is Used, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A21. 
 426. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 63, 64 (2009) [hereinafter Eagle, Directed Growth]. 
 427. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory 
State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 584 (2010). 
 428. Id. at 593-98. 
 429. See Heller, supra note 396, at 626 (asserting that over-specified property rights in 
land preclude effective utilization of property); see generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRID-
LOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND 
COSTS LIVES (2008) (extending Anticommons principles to air transport congestion, patent 
locks precluding pharmaceutical advances, etc.). 
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brium of consumption and use.”430  However, that does not mean that the 
State is the best agent to make the change.  One cannot displace market-
based coordination, which certainly has warts in practice, with an idealized 
form of government-coordinated economy.431  In particular, the fact that 
real property sometimes is used in what some would deem suboptimal 
ways does not prove or even imply that State-driven redevelopment would 
do better.432  One illustration of the failure of control to anticipate the full 
consequences of its well-intended decisions is the attempt to preserve blue-
collar jobs in New York City by prohibiting the conversion of underutilized 
loft buildings so as to provide much-needing housing.433 
F. Agglomerate Proliferation 
As was noted earlier, agglomeration provides increasing returns to scale 
of productive economic and enjoyable cultural and social interactions.434  
But, as is the case with critical densities of fissionable nuclear material, the 
ensuing chain reactions set off by agglomeration are not always socially 
beneficial.  The bad effects include negative agglomeration,435 conges-
tion,436 and what I will call agglomerate proliferation.  While it is conven-
tional to use the term “congestion” as a catchall for all undesired effects of 
agglomeration, I break out proliferation for reasons similar to Professor 
Schleicher’s use of negative agglomeration.  “Congestion” is an apt meta-
phor for the disutility resulting from the conflict between things resulting 
from an agglomeration that are, in themselves, desirable.  Highway conges-
tion resulting from the crowding of highways by workers on their way to 
new jobs within a growing agglomerate metropolitan area is the archetype.  
Negative agglomeration is not a conflict among goods, and agglomeration 
proliferation is not a conflict within an agglomerating area. 
“Agglomerate proliferation,” as I use the term, refers not to the growth 
of agglomerates, but to their proliferation (or, more precisely, to the proli-
feration of aspiring agglomerates).  Local officials, spurred by their own 
dreams, or dreams supplied by erstwhile redevelopers or sport franchise 
 
 430. Ahdieh, supra note 427, at 594-95. 
 431. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 1-2 (1969) (discussing and naming the “nirvana fallacy”).  The fallacy first was 
described in R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960), noting 
comparisons between “a state of laissez faire and some kind of ideal world.” 
 432. For elaboration, see Eagle, Directed Growth, supra note 426. 
 433. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 387, at 251. 
 434. See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
 435. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 383 and accompanying text. 
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owners, decide that their towns need to become hubs of economic activity.  
“Need” and “desire” are not synonyms, and neither equates to “destiny.” 
Owners, or developer’s investors, provide equity financing for projects 
that are independently economically justifiable.  Often such projects consist 
of multiple structures and uses.  These may be owned and financed sepa-
rately and bound together by covenants.  The regional shopping center is 
the classic example.  The principal economic advantage of the shopping 
center over the traditional main street is that the most desirable merchants 
are able to internalize the positive externalities they generate.  On Main 
Street, storefront owners can free ride on esteemed retailers who bring 
droves of shoppers to the block.  In the mall, the sought-after merchant 
would insist on internalizing its positive externality by paying a far lower 
rent per square foot than merchants who live off the traffic they generate.437  
This observation, writ large, is the basis for claims that localities should 
subsidize businesses fostering agglomeration.438 
Where there is no reasonable assurance that the proposed new develop-
ment would pay its own way, even after considering ownership structures 
and covenants that would provide synergies with complementary land uses, 
bringing in government is the logical resort.  The proffered explanation in-
volves the creation of public goods, which are both nonrival and nonex-
cludable.  This means that if government contributes to the new develop-
ment, complementary businesses or competitors would settle in town and 
more skilled workers, vendors, lawyers, and accountants familiar with the 
industry, and others would flock in.  If the city down the freeway could 
prosper through agglomeration, why not ours? 
During the first part of the nineteenth century, the severe depression that 
started in 1837 was due largely to a massive growth in public and private 
debt.  “The ‘orgy of canal and railroad building and of bank organization’ 
was spurred by New York’s success with the Erie Canal in 1817.439  States 
sought to replicate the New York success story and borrowed money to 
fund these internal improvements.”440  Similarly, towns would compete in 
subsidization of railroads, in hopes of obtaining service and becoming re-
 
 437. See, e.g., Marcus Gerbich, Shopping Center Rentals: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Retail Tenant Mix, 15 J. REAL EST. RES. 283, 284-86 (1998). 
 438. See infra notes 443-48 and accompanying text. 
 439. Susan P. Fino, Perspectives: Federal Jurisprudence, State Autonomy: De Tocque-
ville or Disney? The Rehnquist Court’s Idea of Federalism, 66 ALB. L. REV. 765, 769 (2003) 
(quoting Reginald C. McGrane, Some Aspects of American State Debts in the Forties, 38 
AM. HIST. REV. 673, 673 (1933)). 
 440. Id. 
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gional distribution hubs.441  “Although these policies could create local ag-
glomerative benefits if only one local government engaged in them, they 
did not produce net national economic gain, as they created inefficient sub-
sidy competition, political manipulation of the railroad industry, and over-
investment.”442 
Just as prestigious anchor department stores in shopping malls provide 
positive externalities in the form of customer traffic to smaller merchants, 
Professors Teresa Garcia-Milà and Therese McGuire postulated that desir-
able firms will supply new jobs and attract synergetic enterprises.443  “Tax 
breaks are a means of internalizing the positive externality of agglomera-
tion economics.”444  In theory, such tax preferences can create wealth for 
the city granting them and society as a whole, if the city could better cap-
ture the positive externalities than other cities.445  The principal illustration 
in the Garcia-Milà and McGuire article was the recent move of the Boeing 
Company’s headquarters from Seattle to Chicago.  Some five hundred 
workers, mostly from Seattle, would move into an existing building in Chi-
cago.  Chicago provided Boeing $50 million in subsidies. 
In commenting upon the Garcia-Milà and McGuire thesis, Todd Sinai 
noted that “[t]he authors label the externality ‘benefits from agglomera-
tion,’ but it really could be anything productivity-enhancing: from greater 
civic pride to honest-to-goodness knowledge spillovers.”446  He added 
“Boeing may have been a ‘loss leader’ for Chicago, not intended to make 
existing firms more productive, but to act as a magnet for additional 
firms.”447 
Cities motivated to become “centers of excellence” in one activity or 
another, compete for increases in scale that would lead them to become the 
next Detroit or Silicon Valley or Wall Street.  However, firms planning to 
locate facilities play the subsidy offer of one city against another (as did 
railroads) or threaten to leave (as do sports teams). Under these circums-
 
 441. Schleicher, supra note 378, at 1514 (citing Stanley L. Engerman, Some Economic 
Issues Relating to Railroad Subsidies and the Evaluation of Land Grants, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 
463 (1972)). 
 442. Id. 
 443. See generally Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives and the 
City, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 95 (William G. Gale & Janet Ro-
thenberg Peck eds., 2002) [hereinafter Milà & McGuire, Tax Incentives]. 
 444. Id. at 114. 
 445. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 387, at 263 n.47. 
 446. Todd Sinai, Comment on Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives 
and the City, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 124, 125 (William G. 
Gale & Janet Rothenberg Peck eds., 2002). 
 447. Id. at 129. 
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tances, it is easy to dissipate whatever gains might result from agglomera-
tion. 
Professor Edward Glaeser enumerated reasons for tax incentives for 
firms to locate in a city.  These were (1) bids by localities to obtain con-
sumer or producer surplus for existing residents; (2) agglomeration eco-
nomics; (3) up-front compensation for future tax exploitation; (4) tax dis-
crimination against those rooted in a community and in favor of those freer 
to leave; and (5) “corruption and influence.”448 
Thus, while agglomeration economics is the account that captures the 
imagination, it is difficult to discern whether it is another name for the 
largely obscure mixture of motives and relationships that have marked pub-
lic-private urban land redevelopment. 
G. Redevelopment Does Not Embody Superior Knowledge 
Professor Richard Schragger notes that the New Economic Geography 
literature indicates “the reason some places do well economically and oth-
ers do poorly may have more to do with luck or path dependency than with 
particular legal institutions.”449 
Historical accident, path dependence, spatial persistence—these features 
of economic geography suggest that uneven economic development is not 
an aberration but rather a salient feature of economic life.  It also suggests 
that chance and very small perturbations in an existing equilibrium can 
make a big difference to outcomes.  Economic growth does not start from 
a clean slate whereby each political jurisdiction can act to ensure its own 
prosperity.  Geography is not incidental to economy; it is a key feature of 
economy.450 
Despite the facts that well-conceived development can obtain private fi-
nancing and that poorly-conceived projects do not deserve public financ-
ing, government officials try over and over to find middle ground where 
public investment would benefit the locality.  The usual lure is economic 
development and the positive externalities that the project will generate and 
rain upon the city or metropolitan area as a whole. 
Common objects of such financing are athletic stadiums, which have a 
long history of public support,451 and not coincidentally, played an impor-
 
 448. Edward Glaeser, Comment on Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, Tax In-
centives and the City, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 114, 116-20 
(William G. Gale & Janet Rothenberg Peck eds., 2002). 
 449. Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837, 
1837 (2010). 
 450. Id. at 1893. 
 451. See Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports Teams’ 
Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 38-48 (2008). 
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tant role in the Atlantic Yards project that was litigated in Goldstein v. New 
York State Urban Development Corp.452  As Professor Kenneth Shropshire 
noted, the statement most often encountered when sports teams want a new 
home is: “We should build a new facility because the economic impact will 
be tremendous.”453  However, it is almost impossible to determine whether 
a new stadium will have any positive multiplier effect at all.  Beyond the 
construction phase, which often is a significant factor in mobilizing politi-
cal support for an urban redevelopment project,454 most payroll of the 
sports franchise consists of high-dollar player contracts and low-paid, spo-
radic employment of custodial and food vendors’ staff.  Even more impor-
tant, most consumer expenditures for tickets, parking, and food substitute 
for alternative local uses of the family entertainment budget.455 
One overarching theme of the book Sports, Jobs and Taxes, edited by 
economists Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, is that no economist has 
conducted an independent study showing a positive economic impact on a 
city from arena or stadium construction, at least not in the past 30 years.  
There is a big difference, they encourage us lay people to understand, be-
tween economic activity and economic impact. . . . [E]ven the gross eco-
nomic activity of a franchise is relatively modest.456 
Other studies have shown similar results.457  According to Professor 
Zimbalist, “most of the money that gets spent [on sports facilities] is [simp-
 
 452. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).  Although not mentioned in the New York Court of 
Appeals’ Goldstein opinion, “[Bruce] Ratner is also the principal owner of the New Jersey 
Nets.” Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 453. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Sports Facility Construction in the Coming Millennium: The 
Lawyer’s Role, 16 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 27 (1998) [hereinafter Shropshire, Sports Facility 
Construction]. 
 454. See, e.g., Lavine & Oder, supra note 71, at 369 (noting that “the grassroots support 
for Atlantic Yards came mostly from groups that received funding from the developer or 
expected jobs, like construction unions”). 
 455. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss et al., Green Jobs Myths, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 326, 390 n.233 (2009). 
 456. Shropshire, Sports Facility Construction, supra note 453. 
 457. See SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STA-
DIUMS (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds. 1997); Dean V. Bairn, Sports Stadiums as 
“Wise Investments”: An Evaluation, in HEARTLAND INST. POL’Y STUDY NO. 32 (1990), 
available at http:// www.heartland.org/archives/studies/sports/baim2.htm (discussing the 
practicality of public investment in stadiums). Cf., Allen R. Sanderson, In Defense of New 
Sports Stadiums, Ballparks, and Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 184 (Spring 2000) (ar-
guing that public spending on stadia is reasonable unless disproportionate with expenditures 
on highway, airport, and other infrastructure construction). 
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ly] recirculated money within the town.  It does not generate new value 
added.”458 
Despite the lack of economic benefit from publicly subsidized sports fa-
cilities, they are defended as ways of providing the social value and solidar-
ity that comes from rooting for the home team and giving the host city a na-
tional and world identity.459 
Beyond stadiums, many well-known eminent domain projects simply 
have not worked out,460 and numerous major projects have run into trouble.  
In Las Vegas, although the Nevada Supreme Court upheld condemnation 
for urban revitalization for the massive “CityCenter Las Vegas” project,461 
the market does not share the developers’ enthusiasm.462  Perhaps more 
important, an industry research analyst for a leading international commer-
cial real estate brokerage firm noted, “[s]ome of CityCenter’s revenue will 
be revenue that Las Vegas didn’t have before, but we project that 70% to 
90% will be at the expense of existing properties.”463  The notion that cities 
can be brought back to affluence and life by in-migration by suburban emp-
ty nesters and members of the young, bright, and hip “creative class,” an 
idea associated with Professor Richard Florida,464 seems to have been 
overblown.465 
Probably the most visible urban revitalization project in the country has 
been the Fort Trumbull redevelopment in New London, Connecticut.  Pfiz-
er has left New London, the Fort Trumbull redevelopers were unable to ob-
tain funding, and infrastructure for any development such as roads has yet 
to be built.466  A July 2010 account in the Hartford Courant began: “The 
empty expanse that was once the working-class Fort Trumbull neighbor-
 
 458. Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 37 (1999) (statement of Professor Andrew Zim-
balist). 
 459. See Edelman, supra note 451, at 50-53. 
 460. See generally Gideon Kanner, Eminent Domain Projects That Didn’t Quite Work 
Out, SR004 ALI-ABA 291 (2009). 
 461. See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 11 
(Nev. 2003) (adopting expansive views of “blight” and “public use”). 
 462. See, e.g., Alexandra Berzon, Contract Dispute Could Hamper City Center’s Fin-
ances, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2010, at B2 (“Contractor claims against City Center . . . could 
jeopardize the project’s loan contracts and condo sales, the project said in a recent court fil-
ing.”). 
 463. Denise Kalette, Developers Bet a Fortune on Vegas, NAT’L REAL EST. INV., Jan. 1, 
2010 (quoting Jacob Oberman, Dir. of Gaming Res., CB Richard Ellis, Las Vegas, Nev.). 
 464. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND HOW IT’S TRANSFORM-
ING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002). 
 465. See Eagle, Really New Property, supra note 397, at 1261-63. 
 466. Elaine Stoll, Fort Trumbull Developer Asks for More Time, Misses Deadline, THE 
[NEW LONDON] DAY, Nov. 27, 2010, at QQ. 
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hood in New London is an ever-present reminder of the painful eminent 
domain battle that took dozens of homes—and the redevelopment that 
didn’t follow.”467  The account noted the possibility of new townhouse 
construction, but added that they “wouldn’t be built where the properties 
were taken and demolished.”468  Earlier in 2010, The [New London] Day 
noted that the transfer of the underlying Fort Trumbull project land, which 
was mandated by state law, never had been accomplished and that officials 
were equivocating on when that might be done.469  Susette Kelo’s travails 
might have been for naught. 
Apart from specific redevelopment projects, it might be that the entire 
apparatus of government-directed subsidization and condemnation for 
sports stadiums, convention centers, shopping centers, and the like is a 
chimera. 
Professor Edward Glaeser’s research, including data from the 2010 Cen-
sus, indicates that the basis for sustained regional growth is the personal sa-
tisfaction of residents and potential migrants.470  Census data indicate that 
population is not moving to high-income areas, or to areas with high 
amenity values.  Instead, Glaeser states, they are moving to areas where 
housing is cheap because building is abundant.471 
CONCLUSION 
Dissenting in Goldstein, New York Court of Appeals Judge Smith de-
clared: 
The whole point of the public use limitation is to prevent takings even 
when a state agency deems them desirable.  To let the agency itself de-
termine when the public use requirement is satisfied is to make the agency 
a judge in its own cause.  I think that it is we who should perform the role 
of judges . . . .472 
 
 467. Kenneth R. Gosselin, A Townhouse Plan and an Electric Boat Purchase Could Un-
do Some Ill Will In New London’s Fort Trumbull Area, HARTFORD COURANT, July 5, 2010, 
at QQ. 
 468. Id. 
 469. David Collins, New London Should Take Title to Fort Trumbull, THE [NEW LON-
DON] DAY, Feb. 7, 2010, at QQ. 
 470. See Edward L. Glaeser, What Democrats Might Learn From the Census, N.Y. TIMES 
ECONOMIX BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/ 
what-democrats-might-learn-from-the-census/ (noting higher wages, quality of life, and “af-
fordable housing, which typically comes from abundant supply” as the principal factors). 
 471. See id. 
 472. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 190 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, 
J., dissenting). 
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Condemnation for transfer for private redevelopment may or may not 
make sense as a political matter.  As a matter of public policy, its justifica-
tions are doubtful.473  In a speech weeks after handing down the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Kelo, Justice Stevens acknowledged his personal view 
that the “allocation of economic resources that result from the free play of 
market forces is more likely to produce acceptable results in the long run 
than the best-intentioned plans of public officials.”474  As a matter of law, 
however, his promise in Kelo that cases of alleged takings not for public 
use “can be confronted if and when they arise”475 has not come to pass, cer-
tainly not in New York. 
 
 473. See supra Part IV.A. 
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